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HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The international human rights system enters the 21st Century facing a profound
anomaly. Despite remarkable normative and institutional developments since the
system’s inception, 1 the world remains mired in widespread violations of human dignity.
Genocidal episodes have repeatedly scared the consciousness of human kind since World
War II.2 Floods of refugees and simmering ethnic conflicts continually challenge the
international community’s capacity to respond3 and grotesque forms of physical abuse,
such as torture and summary execution, remain commonplace. 4 Despite a promising
trend toward democratic governance around the world, basic civil liberties for countless

1

It is beyond controversy that the international system has developed a legal regime for the protection of
human rights once thought improbable. In addition to an extensive network of widely adopted treaties
covering nearly all aspects human life, the international system boasts an elaborate institutional framework
for protecting human rights. See generally Steiner and Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (Oxford, 1996).
2
See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 65th Session, Summary Record of the
Second Part of the 1665th Meeting, 17 August 2004, Dialogue with Juan Mendez, Special Advisor on the
Prevention of Genocide, CERD/C/SR.1665/Add.1, 20 August 2004 (Committee Member Shahi observing
that “Regrettably, the United Nations itself had been ineffective in preventing genocide. There had been at
least 55 genocides since the Organization’s founding, in which approximately 75 million people had
died.”). See also http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocidetable2003.htm . The persistence of genocidal
episodes prompted Michael Scharf's wry observation that: “[T]he pledge of ‘never again’ quickly
became the reality of ‘again and again’….” Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An
Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 861-62
(1997).
3
The most recent example involves the crisis in Darfur, Sudan. See Report Of The International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 25 January 2005 (available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/darfurreport.doc); Report of United Nations High Commissioner For
Human Rights, Situation Of Human Rights In The Darfur Region Of The Sudan, E/CN.4/2005/3, 7 May
2004 (reporting a “pattern of massive and gross human rights violations”); Human Rights Watch Report:
Darfur Destroyed, Ethnic Cleansing By Government And Militia Forces In Western Sudan, Vol. 16, no.
6(a), May, 2004.
4
Amnesty International believes that as many as 150 Governments continue to practice torture. See
http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/index.do . Recent events at the Abu Ghraib Prison during the war
in Iraq reflects a cold reality for Americans that torture is neither a relic of the dark past nor something
perpetrated solely by barbaric foreign despots. See Amnesty International Report, United States of
America, Human Dignity Denied, Torture and Accountability in the ‘War on Terror’, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511452004 ; Editorial, Legalizing Torture, Washington
Post, June 9, 2004 at A20; Seymour Hearsh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, New Yorker, January 27, 2005.
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millions remain only an empty promise.5 Most disheartening of all, the two greatest
enemies of human dignity, armed conflict and poverty, relentlessly plague the vast
majority of human kind.6 It seems undeniable that the elaborate international human
rights edifice, now often rhetorically central in international relations, has and can make
some difference. Yet, it is equally undeniable that the system has yet to fulfill its
promises or significantly reduce violations of human rights worldwide.7
The apparent inability of the human rights system to deliver effectively on its
lofty and noble promises is not, in many ways, surprising. It is, after-all, a system
designed with significantly limited enforcement capacity. Both Pollyannaish and cynical,
the international system heavily relies upon the dubious premise that governments will
faithfully implement international human rights standards within their own domestic

5

See e.g., Freedom House, http://www.worldaudit.org/civillibs.htm .
The “On War Project,” for example, lists over 70 events during the 1990’s that could fairly be described
as “armed conflicts.” See http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/index.htm visited February 23, 2005. See
also Ploughshares Project, Armed Conflicts Report 2003, available at
http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR04-Introduction.html (providing descriptions of 28
armed conflicts on-going in 2003 in which at least 1000 deaths were reported); Center for the Study of
Civil War (Uppsala University) http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/ (providing a detailed database
concerning 228 armed conflicts between 1946 – 2003). The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization and
World Health Organization estimate that 25,000 people die everyday from hunger and the effects of
poverty, while nearly 1,000,000,000 people are malnourished or hungry. See
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news/2002/9703-en.html . The Ploughshares Project also provides a
map detailing the correlation between armed conflict and high percentages of under-nourished populations.
See http://www.ploughshares.ca/imagesarticles/ACR02/hungermap.02.pdf .
7
There is scant empirical evidence regarding whether the international human rights system is effectively
achieving its objectives. Oona Hathaway’s recent work is a rare example of empirically oriented legal
research in human rights. See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE
L. J. 1935 (2002) (examining the correlations between ratification of human rights treaties and violations);
Oona Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003). See also L. Helfer & A.
Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 345 (1997)
(analyzing state compliance with the decisions of human rights institutions); Randall Peerenboom, Show
Me The Money: The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights Performance in Asia, 15 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 75 (2004)(surveying and discussing attempts to quantify human rights performance with an
emphasis on Asia); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring The Effects Of Human Rights Treaties, 14
EUR J. INT’L L. 171 (2003)(critiquing the premises and design of Hathaway’s study). Improvement in
human rights conditions are difficult to quantify and causal relationships nearly impossible to demonstrate
convincingly given the number and elusive nature of relevant variables.
6
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systems and provide adequate domestic remedies to redress violations.8 This reliance on
voluntary compliance is theoretically bolstered by a network of international mechanisms
and institutions that are, in reality, anemic at best. Although not without exceptions,9
most international human rights institutions are generally limited to monitoring state
compliance and promoting adherence to underdeveloped international standards through
dialogue, condemnation and moral suasion. Most of these institutions suffer from
limited or ambiguous decision-making authority and lack effective, independent
enforcement mechanisms. 10
Thus constrained, the international system has generally failed to check the abuse
of repressive governments and meaningfully deliver the promise of human rights to those
most in need of protection. In essence, the international system’s approach to
enforcement and implementation of human rights has proven unrealistic in a world
characterized by oppression, autocratic governments, poverty and armed conflict.
Although there is no clear consensus regarding what enforcement of international human
rights should look like, few would disagree that existing enforcement mechanisms remain
the weakest link in the international human rights system.
In this essay I consider some explanations for this enforcement gap and suggest
that traditional approaches to enforcement, while serving some important functions, are
inadequate to meet the challenge of effectively realizing human rights in the 21st Century.
These inadequacies include a variety of institutional, conceptual and jurisprudential
8

See infra notes 33-40, 44-45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 115-36, 137-43 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text. It is important to recognize that limitations on the decisionmaking authority of international institutions may serve far more important and less cynical purposes than
preserving sovereign power. In the context of functioning democracies, such limitations may reflect
appropriate concessions to competing interests such as preserving domestic democratic choice, local
autonomy and self-governance. See generally Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human
Rights: The Future of International Decision-Making, 21 WISC. INT’L L.J. 1 (2003).
9
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weaknesses, some of which are inherent in the system’s current design. The most
important of these interrelated weaknesses include: (1) failure to develop a coherent
overall structure with institutions whose attributes are likely to promote the legitimacy of
international decision-making and encourage state respect; (2) refusal to make important
distinctions among rights with regard to enforcement methods; (3) failure to adequately
pursue individual versus governmental accountability for violations; and (4) inability to
develop adequate economic, political, and social incentives that might render voluntary
state compliance a more realistic possibility.
Reform of existing institutions is essential and alternative approaches to
enforcement should be developed. It is time to rethink the approach and role of
international institutions regarding enforcement of human rights. Some important
lessons, in this regard, can be drawn from several evolving alternative approaches to
human rights enforcement and the success of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR).11 In this regard, there are three developing enforcement alternatives that are
particularly important by virtue of their shared emphasis on individual accountability for
a fairly narrow range of egregious, universally understood human rights violations.12 The
first two involve the increased use of “foreign” domestic legal processes,13 both civil and
criminal, to seek individual accountability against human rights abusers outside of their
state of origin. These enforcement approaches might be described as the ‘Filartiga’14 and
‘Pinochet’15 paradigms, based upon the seminal cases that exemplify them. The third

11

See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
Seen infra notes 88-136 and accompanying text.
13
“Foreign” in this sense means reliance on domestic processes outside of the country in which the alleged
violations occurred.
14
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See infra notes 90, 102-114 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 89, 93-101 and accompanying text.
12
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enforcement alternative, of which the Pinochet paradigm is arguably also a part, is the
international criminalization of human rights violations.16 A critical part of this trend is
the evolution of meaningful international criminal law processes, such as those being
developed by the International Criminal Court and ad hoc war crimes tribunals in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.17
Although these developing alternatives are not themselves the answer to anemic
human rights enforcement and each presents its own problems,18 their shared
characteristics provide important reform insights.19 In particular, these alternatives
approaches suggest an important departure from traditional institutional frameworks by
recognizing critical distinctions among rights with regards to appropriate enforcement
methodologies.20 Each focuses upon individual accountability.21 Each takes advantage
of forums with clearly established decision making authority and effective enforcement
mechanisms that are external to the violating state, yet jurisdictionally constrained. Each
focuses on a fairly narrow range of well-defined and egregious human rights violations.

16

See infra notes 91, 115-36 and accompanying text
See infra notes 115-36 and accompanying text.
18
Increased acceptance of alternative methodologies will, in its own right, improve human rights
enforcement options for victims and increase the deterrence of wrongful behavior. See infra notes 144-152
and accompanying text. Some have argued, however, that applying domestic processes to foreign human
rights violations poses problematic issues concerning foreign relations and the role of courts. These might
include the dangers of retaliation, political manipulation and disruption of foreign policy. See, e.g., Curtis
Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457 (2001)(suggesting that
these concerns are raised by international human rights litigation generally); Beth Stephens, Individuals
Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433 (2002)
(summarizing and responding to such concerns). Moreover, for a variety of reasons, it is unlikely that the
alternatives will reach significant number of defendants. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 88-136, 152-53 and accompanying text.
21
Filartiga style cases are technically not limited to individual defendants. In the United States, for
example, a foreign government may also be subjected to civil liability under the narrow exceptions to
sovereign immunity authorized by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(5) and (7).
The narrowness of this relatively recent exception and other complications in suing foreign governments
has caused most litigation in the United States to focus on individual defendants.
17
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These three characteristics sharply distinguish these enforcement alternatives from more
traditional approaches to human rights enforcement.
The most important of these characteristics is a focus on egregious violations of
largely uncontested human rights standards, such as those commonly associated with jus
cogens and universal jurisdiction. This focus serves two related and critical purposes.
First, it recognizes important distinctions among rights in terms of enforceability that sets
the groundwork for desperately needed improvements in the credibility and institutional
legitimacy of international decision-making. As a practical matter, governments are
more likely to create international institutions with meaningful enforcement powers if
such powers are jurisdictionally constrained to enforce rights for which true
international consensus exist.
Second, appropriate distinctions among rights may also serve to preserve and
enhance domestic democracy by reserving the resolution of controversial and genuinely
contestable human rights issues to more accountable and democratically legitimate local
institutions, subject to relatively weak international supervision. Such distinctions reduce
the potential for future, undesirable external interference in domestic democratic choice
by international institutions that lack the credentials, accountability and authenticity to
render democratically legitimate decision-making regarding controversial moral issues.
Correspondingly, such prudential constraints should allow incremental improvement in
the credibility and stature of existing international human rights institutions whose
effectiveness is ultimately vital to achieving universal adherence to human rights
standards.

6
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The persistent, historical refusal of the international system to recognize that not
all rights should be implemented or enforced in the same ways has been a mistake.22 It
may well be that a relatively weak system of international supervision on the global level
is the most appropriate model for those rights involving highly contested moral issues
because that model best supports our common interest in democratic governance and self
determination. In contrast, strong enforcement mechanisms, including authoritative
international criminal law and regional processes, are both more feasible and appropriate
for other rights over which international consensus regarding meaning is clear, such as
torture, genocide and other egregious violations of basic human dignity.23 In essence, the
international system must develop a more rational, nuanced and practical approach to
human rights enforcement if it hopes to fulfill the promise of human rights in the 21st
Century.
Although an unrealistic model for international enforcement generally,24 the
success of the ECHR provides additional, related insights regarding reform of existing
international institutions.25 The court’s development of effective institutional
characteristics and a carefully crafted jurisprudence defining its role vis-à-vis democratic
member states, have been critical components of its successful enforcement record.
Important lessons also may be drawn from the Court’s regional focus and reliance on
independently created economic, political and cultural incentives to induce state
compliance. The ECHR’s success in navigating the inherent tension between
22

The ECHR has developed a sophisticated jurisprudence recognizing the importance of such distinctions
as appropriate to the circumstances of Europe. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and
the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 450-64 (2001) .
23
See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 141-43, 153-55 and accompanying text.
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international enforcement and national sovereignty has positive implications for the still
uncertain and evolving relationship between international institutions and domestic
democracy.
In the following parts of this essay, I first provide an overview and critique of the
traditional paradigms for enforcing international human rights standards. The purpose of
this overview is to clearly identify existing enforcement alternatives and pinpoint their
fundamental weaknesses and limitations. In Section II, I briefly describe the developing
enforcement trends identified above and important characteristics of the ECHR that
highlight lessons for reforming other existing institutions. The remainder of the essay is
devoted to sorting out the implications of these trends and alternatives for the future of
human rights enforcement, with a particular emphasis on the evolving relationship
between international human rights and domestic democracy.

II. The Prevailing Paradigm: Traditional Approaches to Human Rights Enforcement
Accurately generalizing about human rights enforcement is not a simple task.
The international human rights system is neither unified nor static. Over its relatively
brief evolution, the system has generated a rather complicated structure comprised of
numerous institutions of varied decision-making authority, enforcement capacities and
mechanisms.26 The success of these institutions’ enforcement efforts, at least if measured
in practical consequences, has also varied widely. Enforcement within the highly
functional European System of Human Rights, for example, hardly resembles that of

26

The international system’s complexity reflects a lack of coherent overall structure and a pressing need for
reorganization and rationalization that has persisted for many years. See, e.g., Douglas Lee Donoho, The
Role of Human Rights in Global Security Issues: A Normative and Institutional Critique, 14 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 827, 839-50, 859-64 (1993).
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other international human rights institutions, such as those promoted by the U.N. treaty
structure or the other regional systems. Indeed, as explained below, it is somewhat of a
misnomer to describe the current work of many international human rights institutions as
involving enforcement at all.27
Complicating matters, there is considerable disagreement among governments,
scholars and the institutions themselves over the appropriate role and authority of many
human rights bodies. Some of these basic differences in viewpoint, prompted by
lingering ambiguities over legal mandate,28 are reflected in the subtle linguistic
distinctions between words such as monitoring, supervision, implementation and
enforcement. To monitor or supervise may, for example, imply authority to suggest
change but not necessarily the power to bind states in any technical legal sense.
Similarly, even when human rights institutions are given technically “binding” legal
authority, states may refuse to create mechanisms by which to effectuate implementation
of their decisions. Such decisions are, in this sense, binding yet unenforceable.
The term “enforcement” is also subject to ambiguity due to the myriad forms it
may take and the imprecise ways in which it is commonly used.29 For example,

27

See infra notes 32, 46-51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
29
The dictionary definition of the word “enforce” reflects these various meanings: “1: to give force to:
STRENGTHEN 2: to urge with energy 3: CONSTRAIN, COMPEL 4: to effect or gain by force 5: to carry
out effectively (~laws)…” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1981). Enforcement issues are endemic
to the international legal order, which is characterized by institutions that generally lack direct mechanisms
to compel compliance with their decisions. The problems of enforcement and compliance have continued
to generate a steady stream of sophisticated academic literature. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Between Power
and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005); Derek Jinks &
Ryan Goodman, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.
J. 621 (2004); David Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW U. L. REV. 879
(2003); Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002);
Jose Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303 (1998); Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997). See generally, William Bradford, International Legal
Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography, 30 N. C. J. INT’L L. AND COM. REG. 379 (2004).
28
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international institutions and governments increasingly bring pressure to bear on a
transgressing government in order to induce a change in behavior or policy through
public condemnation. Such pressure is often described as enforcement although it
seldom involves mandatory sanctions, rarely induces any change in behavior and can
usually be ignored entirely without serious consequence.30 In the discussion that
follows, “enforcement” is generally used in the more limited sense to describe
authoritative mechanisms that are designed and expected to compel direct consequences,
such as changes in governmental policy, payment of civil compensation, or criminal
penalties, under the threat of meaningful sanction.31

Enforcement is, of course, only

one of the many ways in which state compliance and implementation of human rights
might be induced. As described below, enforcement in this sense forms only a small part
of the existing international human rights regime.32

30

There is no doubt that enforcement of human rights takes place in a more indirect sense on many other
levels. For example, it is not unreasonable to think of state-to-state posturing over human rights in
international relations as a form of enforcement. This is particularly true when such posturing takes place
before international institutions that may condemn a state’s human rights performance with subtle
consequences for that state’s economic prospects and standing in the international community. Similarly,
some states have linked, at least on paper, their grants of foreign aid or trade benefits to certain human
rights standards. See, e.g., Remark, Corporate Responsibility Within the European Union Framework, 23
W. INT’L L. J. 541, 543-43 (2005); Hathaway, Integrated Theory, supra note 29 at 504-05. This is
undoubtedly enforcement on some level since such linkages are designed to induce changes in the human
rights performance of other states.
31
This definition appears analogous to Hart’s position that law, by its nature, essentially requires the
command of the sovereign, backed by meaningful sanctions compelled through the coercive power of the
state. See H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). However, the definition is used here solely in a
pragmatic fashion to provide a meaningful benchmark for evaluating whether and how the international
human rights system may generate practical consequences from legal norms.
32
Promotional activities of international organizations, for example, potentially play an important role in
encouraging state “internalization” of rights through national implementation of legal norms and
empowerment of local populations. The literature regarding state compliance with international law also
suggests that international legal and institutional processes play a subtle role beyond coercion in developing
compliance over time. See generally Jinks & Goodman, supra note 29 (disputing the “premise” that
effective international legal regimes must either coerce or persuade state actors and suggesting that regime
design must account for complex “social” factors that influence state behavior, most prominently
“acculturation”); Moore, supra note 29 at 882-99 (discussing human rights compliance as a form of
“signaling” to other states regarding, among other things, readiness and capacity for diplomatic and
economic relations). See generally, Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
183-94 (1990) (concept of “legitimacy” as an explanation of the “compliance pull” of international norms).
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It is reasonably accurate to characterize the traditional model for implementing
international human rights as involving the interplay of domestic and international
authority along two related paths. The first path rests on the traditional premise that
initial and primary authority for implementing and enforcing international standards lies
with domestic institutions. The second path involves the participation of international
institutions, most commonly through supervision and monitoring of state compliance.

A. Voluntary Compliance and Domestic Primacy
Under the text of most multilateral treaties, domestic institutions have primary
and original responsibility to “give effect” to international human rights and provide an
effective remedy for violations.33 This approach to human rights enforcement, which
might be described as the “domestic primacy” path, emphasizes and relies upon voluntary
government compliance.
In this regard, it is important to recognize that international law does not require
states to authorize direct enforcement of human rights obligations in domestic

33

Article 2 (2) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], is illustrative. It provides: “2. Where not already provided for by existing
legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.” The primacy of national implementation is also reflected in the ubiquitous requirement that
domestic remedies be exhausted as a prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of international human rights
institutions. See, e.g, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 302-46; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9
I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978), [hereinafter American Convention] art. 46(1)(a). See also
Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a),
and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 2, 14 (Aug.
10, 1990). See Pasqualucci, Preliminary Objections Before the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights: Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate Tactics, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 60-61 (1999).
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institutions.34 Traditionally, states have been categorized as either “monist” or “dualist”
in this regard, depending upon whether international obligations are automatically treated
as operable domestic law or, rather, only incorporated into domestic law through specific
executive or legislative action. 35 Monist states follow a “direct” or “automatic”
incorporation approach that essentially treats international law obligations, ipso facto, as
part of the domestic legal system enforceable like any other source of domestic law.
Such direct incorporation would arguably reflect the pinnacle of enforceability since
international standards would be directly applied and violations remedied, at least in
functioning democracies, by independent and effective domestic institutions. 36
So-called “dualist” states, in contrast, generally choose to implement international
human rights obligations solely (or primarily) through legislative or executive
intercession. Under a dualist conception, international obligations gain the status of
domestic law only when affirmatively incorporated into the domestic system. Thus, for
34

Most international human rights treaties include an obligation to provide effective remedies for the rights
recognized in the treaty, but do not require direct incorporation of the treaty itself. See, e.g., Human Rights
Committee, Gen. Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on State Parties to the Covenant,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004).
35
See, e.g., Mark Janis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch. 4 (Aspen, 4th Ed. 2003). See
Harold Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52-57 (2004); Curtis Bradley,
Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530-31
(1999); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987).
36
The actual enforceability of an international obligation would, even under a monist approach, depend on
additional factors. For example, two distinct and critical issues in this regard are the precise legal status of
the directly incorporated international obligation and, allocation of final authority over interpretation of the
precise meaning of the obligation once incorporated. In some states, like Germany, international law is
treated, at least theoretically, as superior to other forms of domestic law. See generally Janis, supra note 35
at 85-86, 97-102, 105-09. In the United States, an incorporated treaty (self-executing) has the
constitutional status of federal law and therefore trumps inconsistent state law but not federal statutes
subsequently enacted. Id. The status of customary international law, while often debated, see note infra,
appears to be lower than either treaties or federal law. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708
(1900). Direct incorporation raises yet unanswered questions regarding the authority of domestic versus
international institutions to interpret and authoritatively apply international standards. At least in the
United States, it seems apparent that domestic institutions would assert ultimate authority over
interpretation of an incorporated international obligation. See, e.g., Brad Roth, The Enduring Significance
Of State Sovereignty, 56 FL. L. REV. 1017, 1029-34 (2004)(asserting that “the treaty interpretations that
prevail are those of United States courts, not international or foreign courts…”).
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example, a dualist state may selectively create domestic laws and remedies that are
designed to protect certain internationally based rights, although the originating treaty or
customary principle is not itself directly actionable.37 In essence, international legal
obligations must pass through a “domestic filter” in order to become an enforceable part
of the domestic legal order.
While useful descriptively, these distinctions fail to capture the complicated
nuances of actual state practice, which most often appears to reflect subtle variations on
the dualist conception.38 Although there is little empirical evidence regarding the
prevalence of either approach to international human rights obligations, it is commonly
thought that dualism is far more common than truly monist approaches. 39 Under these
widespread dualist approaches to international law, the enforceability of international
human rights obligations via domestic institutions ultimately depends on the discretionary

37

See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
See Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-01, 127 (4th Ed. 1997); Henkin, supra note 35 at 865
("Few if any nations are either strictly monist or strictly dualist."); Janet Koven Levit, The
Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSN’L L.
281, 293-309 (1999)(reviewing incorporation practices of various Latin American states). The U.S. legal
system is an excellent example of these nuances. At least nominally, the United States Constitution
appears to create a monist approach. See U.S. Const. art. VI, §1, cl. 2; The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900). In reality, however, United States law reflects a hybrid of monist and dualist characteristics by
virtue of the judicially created doctrine of self-executing treaties and our sometimes ambiguous treatment
of international customary law. “Self-executing” treaties may be directly incorporated into the domestic
legal system and actionable without prior legislative authorization. However, no significant international
human rights treaty has ever been held self-executing in the United States. This is due, at least in part, to
the Senate’s consistent practice of attaching a declaration of non-self-execution to such treaties. See Curtis
Bradley, International Delegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Executing Treaty, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1557 (2003); Lori Fischer Damrosch, the Role of the United States Senate Concerning “SelfExecuting” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 515, 515 (1991). Customary law, in
contrast, is generally treated as an actionable part of the domestic legal system, but with a status below that
of most other forms of domestic law. See Paquette Habana, supra; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). The precise legal status of customary law,
particularly whether its violation is actionable in the federal courts, is still subject to intense debate. See
generally Ehren Brav, Recent Developments, Opening The Courtroom Doors To Non-Citizens: Cautiously
Affirming Filartiga For The Alien Tort Statute, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 265 (2005)(summarizing the debate
over the status on customary international law and the implications of the Sosa decision). See infra notes
and accompanying text
39
See Janis, supra note 35 at 85-86, 97-102, 105-08.
38
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actions of national authorities. Thus, effective domestic implementation essentially rests
upon the voluntary, discretionary actions of each government.40

B. The Traditional Role of International Institutions
Most international human rights institutions have, at minimum, responsibility to
“monitor” or “supervise” the presumed national implementation of international
obligations by state parties. In this sense, the traditional model for effectuating
international rights necessarily also implicates international authority. Thus, a second
major path of human rights enforcement involves the work of international human rights
institutions and the response of domestic legal systems to that work product. The critical
considerations in this regard involve the authority of international institutions and
mechanisms for enforcement.
Theoretically, the international side of rights enforcement could take place under
a vertical or “top-down” model in which authoritative international human rights
institutions would directly compel compliance with human rights standards, utilizing
means ranging from an “international marshal’s office” to binding economic sanctions.41
As currently situated, however, international human rights institutions do not enjoy the

40

One might presume that states ratify human rights treaties with a commitment to voluntarily comply with
their provisions for the good of their people. More cynical explanations for state ratification of treaties are,
sadly, more plausible. Many states undoubtedly join human rights treaties precisely because they expect
few consequences from doing so. How else can one explain widespread adoption of human rights treaties
among the world’s most egregious violators?
41
Arguments favoring “linkages” between human rights compliance and participation in international
economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO are creative extensions of this basic idea.
See generally, David Leebron, 2002 Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO : Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L
L. 5 (2002); Jagdish Bhagwati, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, Afterword: The Question of
Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 132 (2002); Frank Garcia, 1998 Symposium: Trade and Justice: Linking
the Trade Linkage Debate, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 391 (1998).
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capacity to directly enforce their own decisions.42 Lacking their own enforcement
powers and mechanisms, these institutions must instead rely on the domestic enforcement
capacities and good will of domestic governments.
Because of this, the theoretical apex of enforceability for international institutions
would occur if and when states recognized international decisions as authoritative and
binding, and allowed the direct enforcement of such decisions by domestic institutions.
In essence, states could choose to give the decisional output of human rights institutions
“direct effect”43 without requiring prior legislative or executive action or approval. The
reality is, however, that international law does not require that states adopt this approach
to international decision-making and few, if any, states appear to have done so.44 For the
vast majority of the international community, the decisions of international human rights
institutions are simply not treated as binding or authoritative within the domestic legal
order, even if technically “binding” under the relevant treaty regime.45

42

Even international criminal law institutions such as the ICTY and the ICC are generally forced to rely on
the existing institutional enforcement mechanisms of member states. The ICTY may indict, issue arrest
warrants, prosecute and sentence perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and has the imprimatur and
authority of the United Nations Security Council. Yet, it has no means of directly effectuating any of these
powers. Rather, the ICTY relies on enforcement capacity of member states that agree to carry out its orders
and ultimately even punish those convicted. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Overview, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm ;William A. Schabas, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 176 (2001).
43
Recognition of the decisions of international institutions presents distinct issues from the question of
incorporation of international obligations generally. See note 36 supra.
44
See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Towards An International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 49195 (2003). There are, of course, exceptions such as Costa Rica. See H. Jarmul, The Effect Of Decisions Of
Regional Human Rights Tribunals On National Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 317-18 (1997)
citing Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission 16, 26 OEA ser.L/III.6, doc. 13 rev.
(1982)(legislation ratified by the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica on September 9, 1983, Law No.
6889). Even within the highly effective European system, both the European Court of Justice of the
European Union and the ECHR primarily rely on the willingness of member states to voluntarily comply
with and enforce their judgments. See Slaughter & Helfer, Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7 at
297.
45
A good example of this is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See note infra. Although the
Court’s decisions under the American Convention’s individual petitioning process are technically binding
on the state defendant, See Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14, 2000,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), P 14 (2000), States have often simply ignored the Court, inevitably without
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Ultimately, most governments choose to enforce international decisions, if at all,
solely through discretionary domestic legislative or executive action. Governments have
generally reserved to themselves final discretion regarding the actual manner and method
for enforcement of international institution decisions, if they enforce them at all. The key
element to effective enforcement once again lies with each government’s discretionary
voluntary compliance, in this instance whether to treat the output of international human
rights bodies as authoritative and translate those decisions into action.
It is fair to say that the traditional model for human rights enforcement involves a
rather murky convergence between the two enforcement paths described above.
International human rights treaties generally place primary responsibility for
implementation and enforcement in the hands of national authorities subject to typically
ambiguous international supervisory powers. International institutions monitor state
compliance and may offer alternative forms of redress when the national system fails.
These international processes are not generally authoritative, however, and even when
technically binding lack clear enforcement mechanisms. The effectiveness of
international remedies is, in turn, almost always dependent on the subject government’s
willingness to voluntarily comply. Since international institutions lack both authority and
independent enforcement capacities, actual enforcement of international remedies

serious consequences. See, e.g., H. Jarmul, supra note 44 at 317-18. See also Lawrence Helfer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash
Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1870-94 (2002) (discussing the withdrawal
from HRC's jurisdiction by three Caribbean nations after adverse rulings). In contrast, virtually all parties
to the European Convention on Human Rights have acknowledged the binding nature of the ECHR’s
decisions. See Slaughter & Helfer, Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7 at 276, 295-97. National
courts may, of course, sometimes choose to follow the decisions of international tribunals as persuasive
authority. See Martinez, supra note 44 at 491-95 (describing the occasional persuasive influence of
international decision making on national courts, including the controversial influence of international and
foreign law on the U.S. Supreme Court).
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ultimately depends upon the willingness of the perpetrators to meaningfully implement
rights and comply with international supervisory authority.

C. Institutional Failures and Ambiguous Authority
It is important to recognize initially that much of the work product of the current
international human rights system is not designed for enforcement, at least in the sense
described above. Rather, existing institutions are designed primarily to promote human
rights through disclosure, dialogue and technical assistance. For example, the United
Nations Charter based system, which primarily involves the politically dominated work
of the Commission on Human Rights and its various subsidiary organizations,46 does not
seek to enforce human rights in any direct manner.47 Institutions created under the U.N.
sponsored network of multilateral human rights treaties are also primarily involved in
work better described as promotion rather than enforcement. Each of the seven major
multilateral human rights treaties sponsored by the U.N. creates a “committee” of experts

46

See generally, Weissbrodt, Fitzpatrick & Newman, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND
PROCESS, Ch.6 (3rd Ed., 2001). Commonly referred to in Western press as “discredited,” the Commission
was replaced on March 27, 2006, by a reformed “Human Rights Council.” See
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=114&Body=human%20rights%20council&Bod
y1= . The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has become increasingly important as a
spokesperson and promoter of human rights and often provides a rapid response to developing human
rights crises. The Commissioner’s office has also organized and provided a more visible and centralized
face to the U.N.’s important human rights activities. Thus far, however, the High Commissioner serves no
direct enforcement role and has no overt authority in that regard.
47
With some minor exceptions, these U.N. “Charter-based” institutions essentially provide for a forum for
public condemnation of friendless states guilty of a “consistent pattern of gross violations.” With no
authority to provide individual redress and no history of pursuing organized consequences for violating
states, the work of these U.N. Charter-based institutions simply doesn’t involve enforcement in any
meaningful sense, even though the CHR has the authority to refer matters to the U.N. Security Council.
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who primarily serve fact finding and promotional roles, reviewing state periodic reports
on implementation and issuing “general comments.”48
Although there has been some effort to assert authority to bind states pursuant to
the general comments,49 it would be a misnomer to refer to such work as “enforcement,”
at least in the sense described above.50 The promotional activity of human rights
institutions focuses almost exclusively on encouraging states to voluntarily change their
behavior through dialogue, confrontation and exposure regarding alleged violations of
international standards. This activity has important benefits but cannot, at least in the
short term, be relied upon as a meaningful way to compel compliance with rights where
needed most.51
Enforcement is probably more apropos and relevant to the various individual
petitioning processes created by the regional systems and four of the major multilateral
treaties.52 Each of the three regional human rights systems – the Inter- American,

48

See generally Donoho, Institutional Critique, supra note 26 at 859-862 (1993); Alston & Steiner, supra
note 1.
49
The Human Rights Committee appears to believe that General Comments issued by the Committee are
authoritative and binding on the state parties. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24
(52), General Comment On Issues Relating To Reservations Made Upon Ratification Or Accession To The
Covenant Of The Optional Protocols Thereto, Or In Relation To Declarations Under Article 41 Of The
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994).
50
See supra note and accompanying text. In some instances, the line between enforcement and
“monitoring” is somewhat blurry. For example, the Commission on Human Rights has, since 1985,
appointed a “Special Rapporteur on Torture” who has the authority to not only conduct fact-finding but
also release “urgent appeals” to governments regarding the treatment of specific individuals at risk of
torture. See http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur/ .
51
See supra note 32, infra note 154-55 and accompanying text.
52
There are currently seven major treaty-based monitoring institutions operating under the United Nations
system. Each of these “committees” is entrusted with monitoring state compliance with the rights
recognized in their respective treaty texts. These seven major treaties comprehensively cover civil and
political rights (ICCPR, supra note 33), economic and social rights (International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan 3, 1976), [hereinafter ICESCR]), racial
discrimination (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106A (xx), 20 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. I) 47, UN Doc. A/6014, 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]), gender discrimination (Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GA Res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No.
46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]), torture (Convention
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European and African – administer individual petitioning processes under which human
rights victims may bring their complaints, after exhaustion of domestic remedies, before a
judicial or quasi-judicial body for resolution. 53 ICCPR, CAT, CERD and CEDAW
create similar processes that apply to any state that has voluntarily agreed to the relevant
committee’s petitioning jurisdiction.54

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 (1984)[hereinafter CAT]) ; children’s
rights (Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N.
doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter Children’s Convention]; and the rights of migrant workers,
(Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, GA
Res. 45/158 (1990).
53
The three regional systems are each designed to promote adherence to comprehensive regional human
rights treaties covering a wide variety of human rights concerns. Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by Protocol 11, Nov. 1, 1998,
(European Convention); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 61, 63, 68, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 24, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, (3rd Edition, H. Hannum, ed. 1999) at Chs. 7-9. The OAS has empowered the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which must be distinguished from the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, to serve monitoring functions under the OAS Charter and the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission also serves a quasi-judicial function, along
with the Inter-American Court, under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. See Cecilia
Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 439 (1990); V. Rodriguez & M. Seitles, The
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and A Modern-Day
Critique, 16 N.Y.L.S. J. H. RTS 593 (2000). In 1998, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a
Protocol to the African Charter which established an African Court on Human Rights to complement the
work of the pre-existing African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. The court is not yet
operational and may be merged with the African Court of Justice. See Curry, Cevra & Palmer, Updates
From the Regional Human Rights Systems, 12 HUM. RTS BRIEF 23 (2005); Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights,
OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), art. 27(2) (June 9, 1998). Each provides, with variations,
a petitioning process that allows individuals to seek redress for alleged violations of the relevant treaty by
their government. For a general description of these various processes generally Alston & Steiner, supra
note 1.
54
Apart from the American Convention, each relevant treaty authorizes the petitioning process only for
those state parties that specially consent. See e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,(302-46); CERD, supra note 52 at art. 14; CAT, supra note 52 at
art. 22. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women , U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/4 (1999). As of March, 2006, 78 states had become parties to the Protocol.
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/text.htm . By March, 2006, the Committee had
rendered views concerning 3 communications. See
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/dec-views.htm . The Committee on Migrant Workers
(CMW), which held its first session in 2004, will have competence to hear individual complaints once 10
state parties declare themselves subject to the process authorized in Article 77 of the Convention. See
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm .
A draft optional protocol that would create an individual communications process under the ESCRC is now
under consideration by a special working group of the CHR. See
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There are, of course, variations in the precise operation of these various
petitioning systems. In general, however, each essentially provides an international
forum before which individuals, from those states that have specially consented, may
allege that the government has violated treaty based human rights standards. In each
system, those states consenting to the process have authorized international decision
makers to examine such allegations and, at minimum, present their views as to whether
the government has complied with the relevant international agreement. As described
below, the most critical question regarding these petitioning processes lies in the
authoritativeness and enforceability of the various institutions’ decisions.
The European system, under the leadership of the ECHR, has undoubtedly the
most impressive enforcement record of these various individual petitioning systems.55
Consent to the ECHR’s jurisdiction is mandatory for all 41 members of the European
Convention and the Council of Europe.56 Although not without exceptions, the decisions
of the ECHR are generally respected and implemented by the state parties of the
European Convention.57 In some senses, the European system provides evidence

http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/index.htm . Parties to the American Convention subject
themselves to the Convention’s individual petitioning process before the Inter-American Commission by
virtue of joining the treaty. American Convention, supra note 33 at Art. 44. They may also, in their
discretion, subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, which reviews decisions
made by the Commission regarding individual petitions. See id at Art. 62.
55
See generally Andrew Drzemczewski and Meyer-LeDwig, Principle Characteristics of the New ECHR
Control Mechanism, As Established by Protocol 11, 15 AM. RTS. L.J. 81, 82 (1994); Slaughter & Helfer,
Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7 at 282-337.
56
European Convention, as amended by Protocol 11, Art. 34, supra note 53.
57
See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. Most commentators, and the ECHR itself, see Effects of
Judgments or Cases, http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/edocs/effectsof judgments.html , suggest that there is a
very high rate of state compliance with the Court’s decisions. See, e.g., Slaughter & Helfer, Supranational
Adjudication, supra note 7 at 276, 296. Professors Yoo and Posner, however, suggest that there is
insufficient empirical data to support such assertions regarding compliance with ECHR decisions. See
Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (2005). But see
Helfer & Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo,
93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005) (challenging Posner & Yoo on methodology and conclusions).
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regarding how traditional approaches to human rights enforcement might work under the
right circumstances.58
The ECHR’s success in securing compliance, while not unblemished,59 stands in
sharp contrast to the record of other international petitioning systems. The InterAmerican system, for example, has had limited success in enforcing the decisions of its
Commission and Court, even though those decisions are also technically “binding” under
the American Convention on Human Rights.60 The enforcement record regarding
decisions of the treaty-based bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee, is even more
disappointing.61
There are undoubtedly many reasons why it has proven difficult to enforce the
adjudicatory decisions of international human rights institutions outside the context of
Europe. Most significantly, however, states have found it easy to ignore such decisions
as the result of three related factors: (1) ambiguous mandates and limited legal authority;
(2) lack meaningful legal or practical incentives to induce state compliance; and (3)
insufficient institutional legitimacy to induce voluntary compliance.62
Governments have not found it particularly painful to ignore the views and
recommendations of most international human rights institutions because there are few, if
any, serious consequences associated with doing so. Most governments comply with
58

See infra notes 137-43, 139-41 and accompanying text.
See Christian Tomuschat, Quo Vadis Argentoratum? The Success of the European Convention on
Human Rights and a Few Dark Stains, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 401 (1992) (discussing problems with delay,
implementation and enforcement); Paul Mahoney, New Challenges for the European Court of Human
Rights Resulting From the Expanding Case Load and Membership, 21 Penn. St. Int’l L. Rev. 101, 101-102
(2002) (continuing problems with caseload and delay).
60
See, e.g., H. Jarmul, supra note 44 at 317-18 (1997); Kimberly King-Hopkins, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights: Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite in Resolving Human Rights Disputes? 35
TULSA L. J. 421, 432-43 (2000).
61
Indeed, given the ambiguous legal status of such decisions and the absence of independent international
enforcement mechanisms, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the lack of compliance with HCR
decisions as a lack of voluntary compliance rather than a failure of enforcement.
62
See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
59
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such decisions only when it is politically expedient to do so.63 Lacking mechanisms that
compel compliance through sanction or other meaningful practical incentives,
enforcement of international decisions depends entirely on the political goodwill of the
government concerned. Given that the government is, by definition, the perpetrator of
the alleged violation; it is hardly surprising that compliance is the exception, especially in
states ruled by oppressive regimes. There is, in this sense, an inherent contradiction built
into the system’s approach to enforcement, which leaves compliance largely within the
discretion of the perpetrators.
Reliance on voluntary compliance does not, of course, doom the human rights
system to failure. Indeed, voluntary compliance with the decisions of respected
international institutions should, ideally, have a central role in a rationally designed
international enforcement regime.64 Even in functioning domestic legal systems, it is
primarily respect for the authority of the institution that ultimately renders judicial
decisions readily enforceable, not any inherent power wielded by the court itself.65
Voluntary compliance has also been essential to the success of the European system.66
63

Australia’s compliance with the HRC’s controversial Toonen decision is a good example of this.
Tasmania stood alone among Australian states in its outdated condemnation of consensual homosexual
conduct and the Australian federal government was in full agreement with the HRC on the merits. See
Steiner & Alston, supra note 1 at 740. Other countries such as Canada and Finland, however, have
frequently chosen to comply with HRC decisions with which they disagreed. These successes demonstrate
again that compliance depends upon the political good will of the state, leaving enforcement least likely
where it is needed most.
64
See infra notes 154 and accompanying text.
65
President Andrew Jackson’s alleged response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), which would have potentially conflicted with a federal
policy of forcibly removing Native Americans from their ancestral lands, highlights this point. Faced with
the prospect of using federal authority to enforce the decision against state officials, Jackson is alleged to
have said: “Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” See Encyclopedia Britannica On Line,
available at http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9116896
66
In Europe, the failure to comply with the decisions of the ECHR may lead to action by the Council of
Europe but the ECHR itself has no direct enforcement powers. Under Article 46 of the Convention
member states pledge to “abide by” the Court’s judgments. The Committee of Ministers, the central
decision making body in the Council of Europe, has the authority to “supervise” compliance. It serves this
function in a systematic fashion by placing judgments on the public agenda of its regular meetings and
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Although it operates under sui generis circumstances, the European system relies heavily
on national enforcement and voluntary government compliance with the decisions of the
ECHR. In this regard, the European system appears to thrive by virtue of a happy
coincidence of mutually reinforcing incentives and the respect that the ECHR has earned
over time. Similarly, a critical reason for the dearth of voluntary compliance outside
Europe undoubtedly lays in the fundamental lack of respect that states exhibit toward the
authority of most other existing human rights institutions and the paucity of incentives to
induce such respect and compliance.
This apparent lack of respect for the authority of international human rights
institutions is undoubtedly related to ambiguity regarding their legal mandate67 and
doubts over the legitimacy of “external” international decision-making regarding
domestic practices.68 The problem in this sense is two-fold. On the one hand, most
international institutions have ambiguous or ill-defined legal authority that potentially
could be interpreted as including authoritative jurisdiction over an extremely wide-range
inviting the member state to report on compliance. See Committee of Ministers Web Site on Execution of
Judgments, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/execution/ See also Committee Rules on Application
of Article 46 (2)(Enforcement of Judgments),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=736/4.2&Sector=secCM&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=appendix5&B
ackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75
On a practical level, effective enforcement also depends upon each state’s approach to incorporation of
treaty obligations and the decisions of international bodies, with national courts playing a prominent role.
See, e.g., John Cary Sims, Compliance Without Remands; The Experience Under The European
Convention on Human Rights, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 639, 643-44 (2004). There are many political, economic
and cultural incentives within the European system that promote what is essentially voluntary compliance.
See e.g., Scott Stephans, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 WISC.
L. REV. 551, 605-611 (2004) (discussing how human rights norms in Europe are “embedded” within a
network of mutually beneficial reciprocal state interests). See also Yoo & Posner, Judicial Independence,
supra note at 64-66. These circumstances clearly distinguish the European system from other international
human rights institutions. See infra note 139-41 and accompanying text.
67
See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. Unresolved ambiguities over authority have plagued
international institutions from their inception. In many ways, the lack of human rights enforcement has
been defined by the persistent unresolved tension between international and domestic authority regarding
the status of international institutions, human rights treaties and international law itself. Most human rights
treaties reflect this unresolved tension by leaving the respective roles of international and domestic
institutions ill defined and ambiguous.
68
See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 50-51.
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of human rights issues including those with highly debatable or controversial substantive
content. At the same time, these institutions lack the attributes of institutional legitimacy
that might engender widespread state trust and respect. Virtually all of these international
institutions, outside of Europe, suffer from politicized appointment processes, lack of
financial resources, poorly defined legal authority, failure to utilize full-time professional
judges and flawed fact finding processes. 69 These international decision makers are
generally unaccountable in the most literal sense, and render decisions that are, by
definition, external to the body politic where the alleged violations occurred.
More significantly, these institutions have also failed to carefully and
incrementally develop their own legitimacy and credibility over time in light of practical
limitations on their powers and capacities.70 They have, in essence, failed to evolve an
appropriate and realistic relationship vis-à-vis domestic authority and democratic
institutions. The circumstances of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), created by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are representative.
On the one hand, the substantive scope of human rights issues covered by the
ICCPR is enormous, including both rights over which little legitimate dispute is possible
(torture) as well as those raising morally charged issues that are highly contested in
domestic societies (privacy, free speech, gay marriage). At the same time, the HRC’s
69

See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 36, 51-52; Donoho, Institutional Critique, supra
note 26 at 854-68.
70
One might, in this regard, contrast the historically incremental development of the ECHR’s authority
with the recent controversial assertions of authority (whether legally justified or not) by the HRC.
Compare H. Yourow, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 196 (1996) (reviewing the incremental growth in the ECHR’s legitimacy and
authority) with L. Helfer, Backlash, supra note 45 (describing the controversy over decisions by the HRC
regarding application of the death penalty among Caribbean states). See also Helfer & Slaughter,
Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7, at 315-17, 355-56, 367, 336-68 (also providing a general
overview of similarities and contrasts between the characteristics and circumstances of the HRC and the
ECHR); Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for DeMarginalizingEnforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 214-37, 252-60 (1998).

24

Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
authority over this potentially wide range of issues is poorly defined. Article Two of the
ICCPR endorses the primacy of national implementation and enforcement of rights,
suggesting that domestic institutions have primary authority to implement and remedy
rights recognized in the covenant.71 Yet, the Committee is required in its consideration of
state periodic reports and in “general comments” to monitor state compliance with the
treaty and provide guidance to the parties. Similarly, under the individual petitioning
process created by the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, the HRC is called upon to render its
“views” and recommend appropriate remedies for violations.72 Thus, while the HRC has
no explicit authority to render binding interpretations of the covenant itself,73 its
functions obviously require some implicit authority to interpret the meaning of rights.
What role is the HRC to have? Here reasonable differences of opinion are
possible if not encouraged by the treaty. The Committee itself has essentially taken the
position that states are bound by their treaty obligations to implement the Committee’s
decisions.74 However reasonable this position may be, it has only minimal textual
support and there is no evidence that the Committee’s decisions are treated as
71

CCPR, supra note 33 at Art. 2.
See Optional Protocol, supra note 33 at Art. 5(4) (“receive and consider” communications from
individuals and “forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual.”)
73
Neither of the two general powers given to the HRC, to review state periodic reports and issue general
comments, include textual support for authoritative supervisory powers. CCPR, supra note 33 at Art.
40(“study” periodic reports of state parties and “transmit its reports and such general comments as it may
consider appropriate” to the parties). See also Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 70 at 235-39.
74
In 1994, the HRC declared in General Comment 24(52) that it had the authority to determine the validity
of state reservations. See William Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & LAW 79, 90-95, 109 (1997); Robert Rosenstock, Current Development: The Forty-Ninth Session
of the International Law Commission, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 110 (1998). More controversial, the HRC
also announced that reservations found invalid, such as the U.S. reservations on the death penalty, were
legally "severable" such that the reserving state was a full party to the treaty as if no reservation had been
entered. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24, Nov. 2, 1994, para. 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add.6. More recently, the HRC has declared that Canada violated the ICCPR by
refusing, pursuant to an HRC interim measure, to stay the deportation of a man seeking review before the
HRC. Ahani v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., para. 1.2, 5.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (2004) (available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/UNHRC/2004/20.html).
72
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authoritative within the domestic systems of the various state parties.75 Indeed, it seems
probable that many state parties never intended to create such authority and some major
governments, including the United States, have expressly disavowed its existence.76
Moreover, the HRC is sorely lacking in institutional attributes that might enhance
its legitimacy and engender state respect for its authority. The 18 part-time “experts”
who serve on the committee come from diverse backgrounds and cultures.77 The process
for selecting such experts is largely political with virtually no democratic domestic
involvement.78 The committee has no real fact finding processes, no appellate review
process and virtually no oversight.79 Under these circumstances, it is simply not
surprising that governments have been slow in legitimizing the HRC’s work product and

75

The judgments of the H.R.C. under the individual petitioning system, for example, are not generally
thought to be enforceable in the domestic courts of state parties. See e.g., Ahani v. Canada (Att'y Gen.),
[2002] 58 O.R.3d 107, 108, 117-21 (Canada not bound to stay deportation proceedings based on the views
of the HRC). Perhaps more significantly, States have tended to ignore the recommendations of treaty-based
monitoring bodies. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 2002, Vol 1, para. 95, UN Doc. A/57/40
(2002) para. 225 (estimating only 30% compliance); Report of the Human Rights Committee 2004, Vol I,
para. 256 (2004)(noting trend of non-compliance and expressing “deep concern” over the “increasing
number of cases where states parties fail to implement” Committee’s final views on individual petitions).
See also Dana D. Fischer, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICE 188 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1994).
76
See Government Responses, Observations on General Comment No. 24 (52), on Issues Relating to
Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in
Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, United States of America, CCPR
A/50/40/Vol.1, Annex VI (1995) (HRC has no power to issue binding interpretations). See also Sylvia
Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese Constitution and
Human Rights, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 469-70, n. 253 (1999)(suggesting that Japanese courts have
generally accepted government arguments that Japan is not bound by HRC interpretations of the ICCPR);
L. Helfer, Backlash, supra note 45 at 1870-1882 (describing the refusal of some Caribbean states to comply
with decisions of the HRC regarding capital punishment and eventual renunciations of the ICCPR itself).
77
See Web Site of the Human Rights Committee, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/members.htm
Geographic diversity is ensured by the requirement that experts are selected in accordance with the usual
UN regional groupings. Id.
78
See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 17-18, 32-33, 32 n. 101, 36-37, 36 n. 110. See
also Anne Bayefsky, Direct Petition in the UN Human Rights Treaty System, 95 ASIL PROC. 71, 74
(2001)(asserting that 50% of the 950 experts sitting on the four UN Treaty institutions with petitioning
mechanisms over a 20 year period had full time jobs with their home government).
79
Most cases before the HRC do not turn on factual disputes but rather involve legal disputes regarding
consistency of government action with the treaty. Nevertheless, individual petitions are considered solely
based on documentation provided by the petitioner and responding state, leaving little room for accurate
resolution of factual conflict.
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reluctant to concede its authority. The circumstances of the HRC are typical of
international human rights institutions. Outside of the context of Europe, the status and
legal authority of international decision-making in human rights is ambiguous at best and
international human rights forums typically lack important institutional attributes that
might boost their legitimacy.
The ambiguous authority and weak institutional characteristics of international
human rights institutions itself reflects the deeper underlying causes of their current
ineffectiveness. Useful contrasts may be drawn between the European system and the
other human rights institutions. The European Court of Human Rights has been
successful not just because it enjoys clear mandates and strong institutional attributes, or
because of its intelligent decision-making. Rather, the Court also owes its success to the
generally favorable political conditions within the member states, cultural and social
affinities, rational jurisprudential limits on its authority and the political and economic
incentives that are associated with compliance and membership in the system. 80 None of
these factors are present in the larger more diverse international community and are not
likely to develop in the near future.

D. Distinctions Among Rights, Institutional Legitimacy and Practical Incentives
There is, in a certain sense, a degree of incoherence built into the international
system’s general approach to enforcement. This incoherence implicates the very

80

See Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful Standards,
27 STAN. J. INT’L L. 345, 463-65 (1991). Cf., Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 61–62 (2005) (characterizing the “institutional setting” of the European
Court of Justice as more like a “domestic court” because of the “bonds” created by the European Union).
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rationale for developing an international system of human rights in the first place.
Lacking democratic safeguards, oppressive regimes face few domestic constraints on
their treatment of people. The international human rights system seeks to create
constraints in the form of international institutions and rules that might limit or temper
government abuse of people. The internationalization of rights is, in essence, the search
for higher authority to constrain the repressive power of abusive governments. 81
Yet, no such higher authority currently exists.82 The international legal system is
generally still deeply committed to state sovereignty, and legal obligations depend almost
exclusively upon state consent.83 Nor is the development of such authority in human
rights institutions likely in the foreseeable future. Outside of the relatively cohesive
regional context of Europe, there are currently few incentives to create and adhere to
broad grants of unambiguous international authority over human rights.84
Governments, whether progressive and enlightened, or oppressive and corrupt,
naturally resist the idea of binding authoritative decision-making by “external”
international institutions, particularly independent ones -- at least with regard to their own
actions. Within functioning constitutional democracies that generally respect basic
81

There are of course other important motivations for maintaining the international system of rights, such
as the progressive improvement in social and economic conditions. Such goals, however, don’t imply or
require authoritative legal status for international institutions.
82
One could certainly argue reasonably that the ECHR is an example of such higher authority and its
potential for human rights enforcement. However reasonable this viewpoint, it is equally clear that Europe
and the ECHR are in many significant ways, sui generis. See infra notes 139-41and accompanying text.
83
It has become almost cliché to assert that traditional notions of sovereignty have changed significantly
over the last 50 years. Extravagant claims about the demise of sovereignty, however, seem exaggerated
when one considers actual state practice. International obligations still ultimately rest on state consent that
can be withdrawn or altered within each state’s discretion. And, even in the context of highly developed
international legal regimes such as the GATT 94, states have surrendered sovereignty only cautiously and
provisionally, retaining discretion whether to bear the economic consequences of non-compliance with
international dispute settlement and decision-making processes. What can be said is that absolute state
sovereignty, to the extent that it ever actually existed, has been eroded in the sense that there is increased
international cooperation among states and expanded reliance on international norms and institutions to
resolve some of their mutual concerns and problems.
84
See supra notes 59-61, infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. [check out goldsmith book….]
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rights, the incentives to create and comply with authoritative international human rights
institutions are limited and the downside significant. Such states generally have their
own extensive domestic safeguards to protect individual rights. However imperfect these
domestic protections may sometimes be, delegation of authority over such issues to
international institutions carries with it a potentially troubling loss of self-governance and
accountability vital to democracy. 85
Among repressive authoritarian governments, the reasons to resist the creation of
effective international authority are more obvious. Authoritative international institutions
would threaten not only the undemocratic government’s prerogatives but also could
challenge its legitimacy and hold on power. Indeed, all states have certain cynical
incentives in maintaining a human rights system that lacks authoritative institutions
capable of binding, enforceable decision-making. Such arrangements allow states to
appear righteous, appease critics and avoid undesirable international pressure while
avoiding the real prospect of meaningful change.
Perhaps most importantly, the international community also currently lacks
practical incentives to create an effective system of international enforcement of human
rights. Any system that effectively enforces human rights against recalcitrant
governments will involve sanctions that pose potentially significant costs to other
competing interests such as trade, security, or foreign relations. History has shown that
85

See Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10 at 49-64. There are undoubtedly significant human
benefits that derive from involvement in an international human rights system even in the context of well
functioning constitutional democracies. In many instances, the international community may provide
incentives for improvement, and a prevailing international consensus might induce changes in social
attitudes. The point here is simply that the case for providing international institutions with authoritative
enforcement powers over contested moral issues is not compelling in the context of constitutional
democracies in light of the accompanying losses of democratic accountability and self governance. In
contrast, when governments abuse fundamental rights relating to physical integrity or central political
rights, the need for effective outside interference is obviously greater and the potential losses to local
democratic choice and autonomy minimal. See id. at 61-64.
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political and economic power is a better indicator of which governments may face
international condemnation than actual human rights conditions. Virtually all states
generally place their own economic self-interest above principled responses to human
rights conditions outside their own territory.
Under these circumstances, governments of all stripes have strongly favored an
emphasis on national enforcement and implementation of human rights via domestic
institutions, conceding only limited and ambiguous authority for international bodies to
supervise that process. They have correspondingly limited international institutions to
anemic enforcement capacities leaving voluntary compliance the order of the day.
This reliance of national enforcement and volunteerism creates the unfortunate
irony that the international human rights system is most needed where it is least effective
and most effective where it is least needed. In oppressive states, domestic institutions are
incapable of enforcing human rights. Thus, where most needed – under oppressive
regimes violating the most fundamental and universally accepted rights – the
international system’s traditional emphasis on voluntary domestic compliance with
toothless international supervision is utterly inadequate and doomed to failure. Where
potentially most effective – in those democratic states which respect the rule of law – an
authoritative international system is least needed and poses significant costs to
democracy.86
These competing forces have produced a complex and ill-defined balance
between international and domestic authority that is still evolving but hardly satisfactory
or even rational. The international system uneasily straddles the competing goals of

86

See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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preserving democratic sovereignty and autonomy and effectively enforcing human rights
against repressive regimes. Two of the most significant components in this dilemma are
the legitimacy deficit of international human rights organizations described above and the
broad scope of issues potentially under their jurisdiction. There is an important
correlation here between these factors and the human rights system’s historical refusal to
distinguish among different categories of rights for enforcement purposes.
Human rights institutions (and many states) have historically resisted recognition
of a hierarchy among rights even for enforcement purposes. This resistance has been
based primarily on the ideological position that economic and social rights are of equal
importance to civil and political rights.87 Whatever the relative merits of that debate, it
fails to address the practical realities of enforcement. Indeed, distinctions among rights
for purposes of enforcement are not hierarchies in the sense of importance at all. Rather,
the point of such distinctions are that some rights enjoy a consensus over meaning that
lends itself to successful international enforcement and the potential development of
more meaningful international institutional arrangements and incentives for compliance.

87

Historically, many non-Western nations have taken the position that economic and social rights have
priority over civil and political rights. See generally, Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should
Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5
HUM. RTS. Q. 467, 469 (1983). See also Melannie Civic, A Comparative Analysis of International and
Chinese Human Rights Law—Universality Versus Cultural Relativism, 2 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 285, 320-22
(1996)(describing China's continuing adherence to the argument that economic rights take priority over
civil and political liberties). Western states have uniformly rejected that position while at the same time
cast doubt about the justiciability of economic and social rights. See generally, M. Dennis & D. Stewart,
Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be An International Complaints
Mechanism To Adjudicate the Rights To Food, Water, Housing, and Health? 98 AM.J. INT’L L. 462, 472-74
(
). These divergent positions, largely political and rhetorical, initially resulted in the creation of
separate international covenants for these two groups of rights. Later, the tension between these viewpoints
led to numerous United Nations pronouncements about the “indivisibility” and “interdependence” of
human rights and a clear aversion to any distinctions among rights, however rational. See, e.g.,
Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil, and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990).
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In the context of our complex and diverse world community, the international
enforceability of all rights is not the same. Certain violations, such as torture and most
crimes against humanity, have a relatively non-controversial and universal meaning.
They involve conduct that is readily identifiable, easily proved and universally
condemned by all. For these reasons, such violations are highly suitable for authoritative
international enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, an enforcement focus on this limited
range of universally accepted rights substantially enhances the potential for improving
institutional legitimacy and alleviating fears about usurpation of democratic prerogatives.
The failure to distinguish among rights for enforcement purposes also relates
directly to the more general problem of institutional legitimacy and credibility noted
earlier. Existing human rights bodies lack institutional capacity and characteristics of
legitimacy that can engender the trust and respect necessary to support either voluntary
compliance or allocation of meaningful enforcement authority. A central aspect of this
problem is a failure of human rights institutions to develop an appropriate role that
accounts for differences among rights and respect for genuine democratic choice.
Both voluntary compliance and authoritative vertical enforcement by international
institutions have important and mutually reinforcing functions in a world characterized
by diversity and conflict. For some rights, an approach emphasizing promotion and
voluntary compliance with international standards rather than authoritative enforcement
makes sense. For genuinely contestable rights whose meaning or application is subject to
public debate within functioning democratic societies, authoritative international
enforcement is unnecessary, impractical and counterproductive given its implications for
democracy. Conversely, for universally accepted and uncontestable rights like torture,
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authoritative international enforcement is both necessary and achievable. A failure to
recognize this practical reality has inhibited the development of meaningful international
enforcement mechanisms.
The international system’s traditional approach to enforcement has failed, at least
in part, because of a failure to recognize such distinctions. Already saddled with weak
institutional characteristics and ambiguous grants of authority, international human rights
bodies are unlikely to engender sufficient state respect to create more authoritative
enforcement mandates absent a more practical and nuanced approach regarding different
categories of rights.
What can and should be done to address these weaknesses and create a
meaningful system of human rights enforcement in the 21st Century? There are, of
course, no easy answers to this question. Reforms should, however, focus on the
weaknesses and practical limitations described above. In this regard, important insights
can be drawn from developing alternatives to the traditional enforcement model and from
the success of the ECHR.

III. Modern Developments in Enforcement: The Evolving Paradigms
Last decade has witnessed the continuing development of important alternatives
to the traditional model of human rights enforcement.88 These alternatives include the

88

There is a significant body of literature exploring each of these developments, some of which categorizes
and evaluates them together as “transnational” law and process. See, e.g., W. Aceves, Liberalism And
International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case And The Move Toward A Universal System Of
Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 129 (2000); W. Burke-White, A Community Of
Courts: Toward A System Of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
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use of domestic criminal processes as reflected in the Pinochet litigation,89 the use of
domestic civil processes following the Filartiga line of cases,90 and the development of
international criminal law processes such as the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Bosnia,
and the permanent International Criminal Court.91 Each of these alternatives has its
problems and none is an enforcement panacea.92 As detailed below, however, these
89

The Pinochet case and its implications have produced divergent perspectives regarding the appropriate
limits of human rights litigation and use of domestic criminal processes. See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 88;
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2129 (1999); Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 452
(1999).
90

Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (1980). The Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga has generated a
tremendous outpouring of scholarly work. Among many helpful articles arguing for expansive use of the
Alien Tort Statute see, e.g., Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Human
Rights Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L.
1 (2002); Beth Sephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 485
(2001); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal
Common Law, 66 FORD. L. REV. 463, 514 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORD. L. REV. 371
(1997); and Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: the Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 141 (2001). Critics of the
Filartiga paradigm include Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, supra
note 18; Jack Goldsmith & Curtis Bradley, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 FORD. L. REV. 319, 356-68 (1997). The case has also spawned considerable litigation
including lawsuits against multi-national corporations. See Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing
International Law, supra note 18 at 437-38 (approximately 100 cases leading to published decisions under
the ATCA); Gregory Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 359 (1999)(describing and
arguing in favor of litigation aimed at multinationals). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) placed significant, although yet to be fully elaborated, limitations
on actions brought under the ATCA. See infra note and accompanying text. See generally, The Supreme
Court, 2003 Term, Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 446 (2004); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 111 (2004).
91
Perhaps the best places to find factual and legal background information on the United Nations’ ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are their respective websites. See http://www.un.org/icty/
(ICTY) and http://www.ictr.org (ICTR). Much has been written, of course, about these tribunals and how
they have functioned. For a thought provoking critique of these tribunals focused on Rwanda, see Jose
Alvarez, Crimes Of States/Crimes Of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999). See
also Makau wa Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMPLE INT’L &
COMP. L. J. 167 (1997). A third ad hoc tribunal with distinct characteristics was created 2001 by agreement
between the Security Council and Sierra Leone regarding human rights crimes committed during that
country’s recent civil conflict. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1315 (2000). See generally, Laura Hall & Naha Kazemi, Prospects For Justice And Reconciliation
In Sierra Leone, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 287 (2003). The “mixed” domestic and international process of this
“Special Court for Sierra Leone” recently served as a model for similar institutions in East Timor and
Cambodia. See Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 343 (Oxford Press, 2003).
92
See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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alternative approaches do provide some direct advantages over existing approaches to
human rights enforcement and, more significantly, provide important insights regarding
potential reform of the existing international system. These advantages and insights stem
primarily from three characteristics shared by each alternative. The first is a common
focus on a fairly narrow range of well defined and universally agreed upon human rights
norms. The second is reliance on, or creation of, generally neutral judicial institutions
with clearly defined and appropriately constrained legal authority over these universally
understood and non-controversial rights. The third is recognition of individual
accountability for the violation of such rights.

A. National Criminalization of International Law Violations: The Pinochet Model
In 1996, Spanish judicial authorities accepted jurisdiction to conduct a criminal
investigation regarding alleged human rights violations committed by government
authorities in Argentina and Chile during military rule.93 In October 1998, Judge
Baltazar Garzon requested that the United Kingdom extradite former Chilean dictator
Augosto Pinochet to Spain to face criminal charges resulting from this investigation. The
relevant indictment charged Pinochet with conspiracy to commit torture, hostage taking,
genocide and summary execution of both Chilean and Spanish citizens during his 17 year
reign of terror that began with a September 11, 1973 coup. This request for extradition
asserted not only jurisdiction based on alleged crimes against Spanish citizens, often

93

For a clear account of the factual background of the case see Richard Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet in
Spain, 6 Hum. Rts. Brief, Issues 3 (1999). See also Diane Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling
Universal Jurisdiction With Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L. J. 1057, 1070-1086 (2004)(providing a
detailed description of the Pinochet case from factual background through the extradition process); Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: The Pinochet
Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311-15 (2001).
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referred to as “passive jurisdiction,”94 but also for crimes against Chilean citizens under a
theory of universal jurisdiction.95 The British courts denied extradition as to many of the
alleged crimes on technical legal grounds relating to the requirement of dual
criminality.96 The British House of Lords, however, ultimately approved the extradition
request as to a limited number of crimes alleged to have occurred after British accession
to the Torture Convention. U.K. foreign minister Jack Straw ultimately denied the
extradition request on discretionary grounds related to the Pinochet’s allegedly failing
mental health.97

94

See Roht-Arrianza, supra note 93 at 314-15; Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1074. See Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 402 cmt. G (1987) (providing the commonly accepted
definition of passive personality jurisdiction).
95
See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1073-74. See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of The United States § 404 (1987)(providing definition and description of universal jurisdiction);
Princeton University Program In Law And Public Affairs, The Princeton Principles On Universal
Jurisdiction 23 (2001), available at http:// www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf . Professor Orentlicher
points out that there are few clear prior examples of national courts relying on principles of universal
jurisdiction to justify prosecution of criminal conduct that took place outside of their territorial
jurisdiction. Id. Israel’s prosecution of Eichmann is a commonly cited example. Attorney Gen. of Israel
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 26 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jm. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277, 298 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962). See
also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D. DC 1988) aff’d, 924 F. 2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Originally developed in response to piracy, see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 156
(1820) ( "[P]irates being hostes humani generis, are punishable in the tribunals of all nations. All nations
are engaged in a league against them for the mutual defence and safety of all."), universal jurisdiction
played a central role in the Nuremberg prosecutions and remains a critical concept in contemporary
international criminal law. See notes infra. See also Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern
Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV INT’L L. J. 183 (2004) (critiquing the analogy to
piracy as a justification for modern applications of universal jurisdiction).
96
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147
(H.L. 2000). See Frank Sullivan, Jr., A Separation Of Powers Perspective On Pinochet, 14 IND. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 409, 415-37 (2004) (providing a detailed description of the legal proceedings in the United
Kingdom, including the legal analysis provided by the House of Lords) .
97
See Sullivan, supra note 96 at 437-40. A commonly cited problem with utilizing universal jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals having little or no connection to the forum involves resistance in the home nation to
outside interference. See, e.g., A. Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" Of Universal Jurisdiction:
Implications For Legitimacy On Trials Of War Criminals By National Courts, 21 BERK J. INT’L L. 111,
140-43 (2003); Henry Kissenger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, FOREIGN
AFF., July/ August 2001 at 86. The exercise of universal jurisdiction also raises legitimate fears of bias,
violations of due process, politically motivated prosecutions and increased international conflict. See, e.g.,
Madeline Morris, Universal Jurisdiction In A Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
337, 340, 352-59 (2001. See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction And Structural Reasonableness, 40 TX.
J. INT’L L.1, 1-2, (2004)(suggesting that traditional constraints on judicial action alleviate many concerns).
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The Court’s decision, although more limited than many advocates hoped, directly
supported the proposition that universal jurisdiction may justify domestic criminal
prosecution of certain violations of international human rights in states other than the one
in which the offending acts were committed.98 More controversially, the decision also
recognized important limitations on public official immunities.99 The British and Spanish
courts, in essence, recognized that Pinochet, and others like him, could be prosecuted for
certain universal crimes through the domestic criminal processes of any state that obtains
personal jurisdiction over him. Citing criminal investigations or complaints brought in
Belgium, Senegal, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, Professor Dianne Orentlicher reports that a “raft
of countries have walked through the door the Pinochet case opened.”

100

Enthusiasm

for Pinochet styled prosecutions has apparently waned, however, in light of controversial
criminal complaints brought against prominent current or former public officials such as
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, former President Bush, Colin Powell, General
Tommy Franks and Dick Cheney, among others.101
98

Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1074; Aceves, supra note 88 at 169-171.
See Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 96 at 206-24. See Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1080-89. Spanish
judicial authorities also separately ruled against Pinochet’s claims of immunity. See Roht-Arrianza, supra
note 93 at 313. Among the primary reasons that judicial refusal to recognize traditional immunities is
controversial involves alleged interference with national reconciliation compromises and foreign affairs.
See Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 Yale L. J. 2537, 2543-46 (1991). The International Court of Justice, however, recently
reaffirmed immunities in the case of The Congo v. Belguim, at least for incumbent public officials. Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), 2002 ICJ
General List No 121 (Feb 14, 2002) available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm . See Sarah Rispin, Implications of
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent: A Setback for International Human
Rights Litigation? 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 527, 527-30, 535-36 (2002). See also Certain Criminal Proceedings in
France (Republic of the Congo v. France) available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-37_xx_20021209.htm (challenge to the legality of
France’s pursuit of criminal charges against the Congolese Interior Minister Pierre Oba).
100
Orentlicher, supra note 93 at 1059-60.
101
See Steven Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 A.J. Int’l L. 888, 891-94 (2003);
Damien Vandermeersch, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 400, 404-09; Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law
99

37

Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06

B. The Filartiga Civil Litigation Paradigm
In 1980, the Second Circuit upheld federal district jurisdiction over a civil claim
brought by a Paraguay citizen against a Paraguay public official for torture that occurred
in Paraguay.102 Building slowly over subsequent years, the Filaritga model for civil
liability against human rights violators has now generated a substantial number of
cases,103 recently including those directed at multinational corporations.104 Much written

Undone by its Global Reach; Cases Against Political Figures Sparked Crises, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2003,
at A1. See also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 147-48
(2004). Spain’s high court has also apparently retreated somewhat from the implications of Magistrate
Garzon’s pursuit of General Pinochet, imposing limitations on potential applications of universal criminal
jurisdiction in Spanish courts. See Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a
Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 589, 590 (2003)(Spanish high court
suggests that universal jurisdiction is “subsidiary” to prosecution in the home state and that additional links
to Spain will normally be required).
102
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
103
Professor Stephens, an experienced human rights litigator who has written extensively on the ATCA,
has reported that “approximately one hundred cases leading to decisions available online have alleged
jurisdiction under the ATCA and related statutes…” Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law ,
supra note 18 at 437-38. See also Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green, Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights
Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary
Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 173 (2005)(citing “at least sixteen” successful suits); Boyd, supra
note at 3, n.6 & App. A (cataloguing 92 cases, nearly 80% of which resulted in summary judgment or
dismissal). Two organizations, the Center for Justice and Accountability (http://www.cja.org ), and the
Center for Constitutional Rights (http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/human_rights/human_rights.asp ) have
served prominent roles in bringing actions against human rights violators before U.S. courts. Although
many cases have been brought, relatively few have resulted in judgments and almost none in actual
collection of damages. See note 150 infra. But see Alfonso Chardy, Torture Lawsuit Halts Lotto Winnings,
Miami Herald, March 31, 2006 at A-1 (state court orders that annual lottery payments of former Haitian
Army Colonel Carl Dorelien be placed in escrow pending resolution of Alien Torts Claims Act litigation in
federal court).
104
See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 952-54 (9th Cir. 2002)(denying summary judgment on claims
that Unocal was liable under the ATCA for aiding the Mynmar Military in acts of murder, rape, and forced
labor);Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F. 3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, 157 F. 3d 153 (2d Cir.
1998)(later dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.
N.Y. 2001). See generally Recent Developments, Corporate Liability for Violations of International
Human Rights Law, 114 HAR. L. REV. 2025 (2001); Case Note, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: A New
Standard For Enforcement Of International Law In U.S. Courts? 5 YALE H. R. & DEV. L. J. 241 (2002).
The Unocal case was recently settled. See Center for Constitutional Rights, http://www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/corporate_accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjID=lrRSFKnmmm&Content=45 (visited
Sept. 23, 2005). Although no cases brought against corporate defendants under the ATCA have resulted in
an adverse final judgment see International Labor Rights Fund Web Page,
http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/ATCA%20summaries.htm (providing a summary of cases
brought against corporate defendants under the ATCA), the business community and the Bush
administration have launched a frontal assault on such suits. See Bush v. Alien Torts, available at
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about,105 this enforcement alternative essentially envisions opening regular domestic civil
courts to human rights victims seeking redress for violations occurring outside of the
forum.
In the United States, where such remedies have been most prominently pursued,
jurisdiction is conferred by statute and subject to significant limitations.106 These
limitations include tight restrictions on suing foreign government defendants,107 due
process requirements regarding personal jurisdiction that essentially require, as a
practical matter, the physical presence of individual defendants in the United States,108
and significant restrictions on available causes of action. Given the limited legal status of
U.S. human rights treaty commitments,109 customary international law has played a

http://www.motherjones.com/news/dailymojo/2003/08/we_522_03a.html ; Harold Koh, Wrong on Rights,
available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2121 (criticizing the Bush administration’s
position).
105
There is a mountain of excellent literature regarding the ATCA ranging from discourse over its history
to the policy implications of utilizing customary international law to remedy human rights violations with
no direct nexus to the United States. See authorities cited in note 90, supra.
106
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2)(2000). It is standard practice in U.S. human rights litigations to allege alternative bases for subject
matter jurisdiction including federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1331 and universal
jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law.
107
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S. C. § § 1330, 1605, has made it nearly impossible to
successfully sue foreign government and their instrumentalities in U.S. courts for violations of human
rights. See Coliver, et al, supra note 103 at 188. The only potentially viable exception to immunity under
the act relates to violations against U.S. citizens by foreign governments designated as state sponsors of
terrorism. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (7); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
See also Letelier v. Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F. 21d
1419 (9th Cir. 1989)(cases in which a foreign state committed a human rights violation on United States
territory thereby losing its immunity under § 1605(5)).
108
See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress, supra note 90 at 153-55, 176, 194-96 (describing
the importance of “presence” as a basis for personal jurisdiction in ATCA litigation and its role during
negotiations of the Hague Judgments Convention). Van Schaack describes significant opposition to socalled “tag” jurisdiction that has served as the basis for some ATCA lawsuits such as the Kadic case. Id.
109
The United States has ratified several major international human rights treaties but, without exception,
declared each of these to be “non-self-executing.” See Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Treaties, Human
Rights and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA L. REV. 399, 416-23 (2000). The United States has also
attached a series of “RUD’s” (reservations, understandings or declarations) to each human rights treaty it
has ratified. These provisions are designed to systematically eliminate potential conflicts with pre-existing
U.S. law and practice. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: the Ghost
of Senator Bricker, 89 A.J. INT’L L. 341, 345-48 (1995); Krisina Ash, Comment, U.S. Reservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3
NW U. J. INT’L H. R. 3 (2005). Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on Proposed United States Reservations to
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central role in the development of the Filartiga paradigm.110 Since only a small number
of human rights violations are considered part of customary international law,111 lower
federal courts have recognized a limited number of actionable violations. The Supreme
Court has recently placed further, potentially significant limits on the types of violations
that may be actionable under the ATCA.112 Although United States legislation
specifically authorizes causes of action for certain foreign victims of torture and summary
execution,113 the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the ATSC essentially suggests
that recognition of remedies for other violations will be limited to those comparable to
18th Century customary international law paradigms, such as piracy.114

CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be An Obstacle to Human Rights, 23 HAST. L. Q. 727, 747-67 (1996).
Such treaty obligations are, therefore, unenforceable under domestic law and U.S. courts have refused to
remedy their violation under the ATCA unless the violation alleged can be established as part of customary
international law. See, e.g., Filartiga, supra note at 880-85; Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 338, 357-61
(D.N.J. 2004).
110
Filartiga and the ATCA have, for example, figured prominently in the academic debate over the
legitimacy of customary international law as a source of U.S. domestic law. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Goodman & Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing, supra note 90. See also Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 at 2770-76 (Scalia, concurring).
111
See Restatement of Foreign Relations, Third, § 702 (1987)(listing seven violations including genocide,
torture, murder or causing disappearance, slavery, systematic racial discrimination, prolonged arbitrary
detention and a “consistent pattern of gross violations”).
112
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2755-64 (2004), the Supreme Court upheld use of the
ATCA to litigate alleged human rights violations occurring overseas but placed significant limits on which
violations could be actionable. In many ways consistent with lower court rulings, the Court found that the
ATCA is purely a jurisdictional statute under which only those violations that share certain characteristics
with claims judicially cognizable when the statute was adopted in 1787, such as piracy, can be brought. Id.
While the precise meaning of this standard is debatable, it is consistent with lower court decisions that have
only recognized claims involving “specific, universal and obligatory” norms of international law. See In re
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F. 3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Harvard Law Review, The
Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L.REV. 446 (2004); Beth Stephens, Sosa V. AlvarezMachain: "The Door Is Still Ajar" For Human Rights Litigation In U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533
(2004-2005)(reviewing the history of the ATCA and its future after the Sosa decision). See also
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa, supra note 95.
113
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2)(2000). The TVPA has been described as
“codifying” the holding of Filartiga. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 138 (E.D. N.Y. 1994). Its
primary impetus, however, was to dispel any doubt about the existence of a cause of action under the
ACTA for torture and summary execution. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, S. Rep. 102-249,
102nd Cong. (Nov. 19, 1991); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 90 at 467.
114
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761. See note 112 supra.
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C. The Developing Use of International Criminal Law Processes
A third significant development in human rights enforcement involves the
continuing evolution of international criminal law and its processes. Between Nuremberg
and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1980, international criminal law remained mired in
world politics with little practical salience to human rights victims. The prospects for an
effective international criminal law process for human rights violations were kept alive
only in academic circles and on the backburners of a few obscureinternational
institutions.
Atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, revived the prospects
for creating an effective international criminal enforcement regime. Viewed as a threat to
peace, these atrocities prompted the U.N. Security Counsel to establish two ad hoc
tribunals with a mandate to deploy international humanitarian law in the defense of
human rights.115 Despite substantial obstacles,116 the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has indicted 161 alleged perpetrators of serious violations of

115

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
annexed to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993); International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/ 955 (1994). Each tribunal has the authority "to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law” committed in limited geographical areas and time frames. (Art. 1)
However, due to distinctions drawn by international humanitarian law between international and internal
civil conflicts, there are differences in the subject matter jurisdiction of the two tribunals. See Mark R. Von
Sternberg, A Comparison Of The Yugoslavian And Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction
And The "Elementary Dictates Of Humanity, 22 BROOK. INT’L L. J. 111, 113-21 (1996). In particular, only
the ICTY is technically empowered to enforce grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while both
Tribunals may prosecute customary international law violations involving war crimes (Art.3), genocide
(Art. 4) and crimes against humanity (Art.5). Id.
116
See Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald, 25 NOVA L. REV.464, 468-70 (2001)(former President of the tribunal
describing the initial lack of support for its work); Mutua, supra note 91 at 180-85 (citing lack of resources
and inadequate cooperation has serious impediments to the tribunals’ work)
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humanitarian law.117 The Tribunal has found approximately 50 defendants guilty and 40
are currently serving their sentence or awaiting transfer.118 More than 70 other defendants
are on trial, in detention or under provisional release. Until his recent death, these
included the former leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.119 The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda has completed 17 prosecutions, primarily of public officials, for
crimes relating to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.120 As of March, 2005, twenty-five
additional defendants were on trial.121 Although subject to legitimate criticisms,122 these
ad hoc tribunals have, without doubt, exceeded most expectations.123
The success of these ad hoc tribunals provided the needed political will to
revitalize long standing U.N. plans to establish a permanent international criminal
court.124 Since the ICC began operations in 2002, 125 it has received 4 requests to

117

See ICTY At A Glance, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm .
Id.
119
Id.
120
See Achievements of the ITCR, http://www.ictr.org/default.htm .
121
Id.
122
See generally Jose Alvarez, Crimes Of States/Crimes Of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 Yale Int’l L.
J. 365 (1999)(providing an insightful critique of the premises which prompted the ad hoc tribunals and
potential ill-effects of primary international jurisdiction);Todd Howland & William Calathes, The U.N.'S
International Criminal Tribunal, Is It Justice Or Jingoism for Rwanda? A Call For Transformation, 39 Va.
J. Int’l L. 135 (1998)(critiquing failures to develop coherent vision of the tribunal in relation to human
rights generally and to national processes); Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts And Fair
Trials: Difficulties And Prospects, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 111, 116-37 (2002)(critiquing deficiencies relating to
presenting an effective defense).
123
Perhaps in response to the perceived successes and failures of the first two ad hoc tribunals, the
international community has participated in the creation of “hybrid” or “mixed” tribunals to address human
rights violations in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor. See generally Laura Dickinson, The Promise of
Hybrid Courts, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 295, 296-300 (2003); Cassese, supra note 91 at 343-46 (Oxford, 2003);
Hall & Kazemi, supra note 91. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, these new tribunals are designed as “mixed”
tribunals in the sense that they incorporate and rely on both domestic and international law and are staffed
by both domestic and international decision-makers. See Dickinson, supra at 296-300.
124
Casesse, supra note 91 at 341. The initial impetus for a permanent international criminal court came
from the U.N. General Assembly after World War II. See G.A. Res. 260B, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1, at
177, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). For an account of these earlier efforts to establish the court and a brief
history of modern international criminal law leading to the U.N. ad hoc tribunals, see M. Cherif Bassiouni,
From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International
Criminal Court, 10 Harv. Hum. Rts J. 11 (1997). See also Casesse, supra note 91 at 327-346.
125
The treaty establishing the Court came into force after receiving its sixtieth ratification in 2002. See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
118
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investigate situations alleged to involve crimes under the treaty.126 Although important
aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction are distinct from its predecessors,127 the Court was
clearly modeled after currently existing ad hoc tribunals. Like the ad hoc tribunals, the
Court is essentially designed to address “serious crimes of international concern” in the
general categories of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.128 Each
category of crime is further defined in the Treaty to include a variety of egregious
violations of human rights committed in the context of armed conflict, such murder,
ethnic cleansing, rape and torture.129 The Treaty also creates a process for defining the
required elements to the crimes.130 While some important and difficult disputes over the
definition of such crimes have and will arise,131 the Court’s substantive focus is limited to
the most egregious forms of human rights violations over which an international
consensus generally exists.
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998)[hereinafter ICC
Treaty]. See Official Website of the ICC, About the ICC, available at http://www.icccpi.int/about.html
126
The Congo, Uganda and the Central African Republic have each referred situations occurring within
their territory to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and possible prosecution. The Prosecutor is also now
investigating the situation in Darfur, Sudan pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005). See
Official Website of the ICC, Situations and Cases, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html .
127
See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
128
See ICC Treaty, supra note 125, art. 5. The Court will eventually also exercise jurisdiction over the
“Crime of Aggression,” once the state parties reach agreement over the definition of that controversial
concept.
129
ICC Treaty, supra note 125 at Art. 6, 7, 8.
130
ICC Treaty, supra note 125 at Art. 9.
131
Opponents of the ICC have cited, in addition to potential third-country jurisdiction over U.S. military
personnel, definitional ambiguity over critical concepts such as military necessity, proportionality,
military targets, and the crime of aggression. See Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal
Court, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 95-96 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, 64 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 193, 209-13 (2001)(discussing the crime of aggression among other definitional issues);
See also Symposium: The International Responses to the Environmental Impacts of War, 17 Geo. Int'l
Envtl. L. Rev. 565, 625-26 (comments of Mark Drumbl) (2005); Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition Of
"Gender" In The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court: A Step Forward Or Back For
International Criminal Justice?, 18 Harv. Hum. Rts J. 55 (2005); Allison Danner & Jenny Martinez,
Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 75 (2005). But see David Hunt, The International Criminal
Court: High Hopes, Creative Ambiguity and An Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. Int’l
Crim. Justice 56 (2004) (criticizing an overly restrictive use of detailed definitions that undermine
flexibility).
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Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, however, the ICC has broad geographic jurisdiction
but only complementary or subsidiary jurisdiction over the prosecution of accused war
criminals.132 In effect, the ICC is designed to prosecute violations of a clearly defined set
of international crimes only when the state of origin is unable or unwilling to do so in
good faith.133 The Rome Treaty also allows for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nonparty nationals when that defendant commits prosecutable offenses in the territory of a
state party.134 The Court may also exercise jurisdiction over a non-party national who
commits prosecutable crimes in a non-party state if that state specially agrees to such
jurisdiction.135 This provision , and allegedly insufficient Security Council oversight
power, has caused considerable controversy and figures prominently in the Bush
administration’s active campaign to undermine the ICC and its potential jurisdiction over
Americans.136

D. Lessons From the ECHR: Institutional Legitimacy and Practical Incentives
The ECHR is neither new, nor in the strict sense of the word, a developing
alternative to the traditional model of human rights enforcement. Originally created just
after WWII,137 the ECHR has had a longer history than most international human rights

132

ICC Treaty, supra note 125 at Art. 17.
Id. at Art. 17-19.
134
Id. at Art. 12 (2).
135
Id. at Art. 12 (3)
136
See Goldsmith, supra note 131 at 90-98; Casey and Rivkin, The Limits of Legitimacy: The Rome
Statute's Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63,63-64 (2003); William Schabas,
United States Hostility To The International Criminal Court: It's All About The Security Council, 15 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 701, 714-19 (2004)(like Goldsmith, also attributing independence from the U.N. Security
Council as part of U.S. opposition to the ICC).
137
Created under the Council of Europe, the Court was formed through the adoption of the European
Convention of Human Rights by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The Convention preamble emphasizes
133
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bodies and considerably more success. In many ways, the ECHR represents the only
example of a traditional international enforcement paradigm that functions effectively,
albeit only on a regional level.138
There are, of course, many reasons to doubt whether the sui generis circumstances
of the ECHR qualify it to serve as a realistic model for other more global institutions.139
The community of nations that the ECHR serves has been, at least until recently,
significantly homogeneous with shared cultural, social and political affinities.140 More
importantly, the region has a shared history and future, not the least of which involves the
extraordinary economic, social and political entanglements of the European Union.
Although technically and legally distinct from the European Human Rights system and
the ECHR, the institutions of the EU have adopted significant commitments to human
rights, following the direction and guidance of the ECHR. 141 These linkages create

the parties’ commonalities, describing members as "like-minded and hav[ing] a common heritage of
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law…”
138
See generally Helfer & Slaughter, Supranational Adjudication, supra note 7(promoting the European
system as a model of effective international adjudication of human rights).
139
Donoho, Universalism, supra note 80 at 463-66.
140
Membership in the Council of Europe has increased dramatically in recent years, especially due to the
addition of former socialist states from Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1990, membership in the
Council has increased to 46 states, with 26 new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Web site of
the Council of Europe, available at http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/ (last visited March 3, 2006).
All of these states have also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights as an unwritten
precondition for membership in the Council. David Seymour, The Extension of the European Convention
on Human Rights to Central and Eastern Europe: Prospects and Risks, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 242, 250
(1993). See also Rudolf Bernhardt, Current Development: Reform of the Control Machinery Under the
European Convention on Human Rights: Protocol 11, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 147 n. 10 (1995). The
addition of states such as Bulgaria, Russia, Albania, Romania and Slovenia, has added significant new
diversity to the European human rights system. See Seymour, supra at 244-47.
141
Over the course of many years, the European Court of Justice has slowly incorporated human rights law
as developed and interpreted by the ECHR, into EU jurisprudence. See generally Dinah Shelton, The
Boundaries Of Human Rights Jurisdiction In Europe, 13 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95, 111-118 (2003).
The ECJ has, however, declared that EU may not become a member of the European Convention: "As
Community law now stands, the Community has no competence to accede to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because no provision of the Treaty confers on
the Community institutions in a general way the power to enact rules concerning human rights or to
conclude international agreements in this field...." Case 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. I-1759 (advisory
opinion). Recent revisions to the EU treaty regime directly reference protection of human rights. See
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vitally important incentives for compliance that are currently absent outside of Europe.
Despite these important differences in circumstances, the ECHR’s successes provide
important insights regarding reform of international enforcement generally.
First, the ECHR serves as proof positive that there are many advantages to
regional rather than global approaches to human rights enforcement. Regionalism may
not only take advantage of cultural and social affinities (in developing culturally sensitive
interpretations of rights) but also profit from critical economic and political linkages that
create practical incentives for state compliance. A regional focus also has advantages for
institutional legitimacy by increasing connections between decision-makers and local
populations.
Second, although the ECHR currently renders judgments over a wide range of
human rights issues including controversial topics,142 it has arrived at this point
incrementally over time as its prestige and credibility warranted. More importantly, it
has imposed on itself important jurisprudential limits that avoid overreaching and
undesirable interference with legitimate cultural and policy preferences of its constituent
national democracies. Primary among these are the principles of subsidiary, European
supervision and the margin of appreciation doctrine that utilizes European consensus to

Shelton, supra at 113-14. In 2000, the EU proclaimed a new Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. The proposed European
Constitution would directly incorporate the Charter and human rights into the EU legal structure. See
Stephen Sieberson, How the New European Union Constitution Will Allocate Power Between the EU and
Its Member States—A Textual Analysis, 37 VAND. J. TRAN’L L. 993 (2004).
142
See, e.g., Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991); B. v. France, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1
(1993)(transexualism); X v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 169 (1997) (state refusal to register
transsexual as father of child conceived through artificial insemination); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)(homosexual sodomy); Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 617, 19-21 (1997) (upholding government refusal to license video based on blasphemous content).

46

Donoho Final Draft 4-19-06
limit the court’s interpretive alternatives.143 This reliance on consensus over the meaning
of rights has been a crucial component in the evolution of the court’s legitimacy and,
correspondingly, its ultimate success in enforcement.
Third, the court’s institutional practices, ranging from selection of judges to
litigation procedures, are far more professional and credible than those of most other
international human rights enforcement institutions. The full time employment of highly
trained professional judges and staff, vetted by the domestic political processes of the
state parties and provided with adequate financial resources, is fundamental to the
ECHR’s success. Finally, as previously noted, the ECHR benefits enormously from
social, political and economic linkages, which provide substantial incentives for
compliance with the Court’s decisions. The development of such incentives, tied to the
decisions of reformed international institutions focused on universally understood rights,
may prove crucial to the eventual enforceability of international rights generally.

IV. The Future of Human Rights Enforcement
Both the success of the ECHR and developing enforcement alternatives described
above potentially have two significant implications for the future of human rights
enforcement. First, these developments have some potential for creating effective
alternatives to more traditional approaches to enforcement. As noted below, however,
there are certain problematic aspects to these alternatives that may limit their potential
usefulness in this regard. Second, and perhaps more importantly, these developing

143

See generally Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance and the Margin of Appreciation, supra note 22 at
450-66.
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alternatives may provide critical insights regarding how to remedy critical weaknesses in
existing approaches and institutions.

A.

Providing Effective Enforcement Alternatives

How might the enforcement alternatives described above directly advance the
effectiveness of human rights? In the first instance, all three alternatives have some
potential for enhancing deterrence against violations of international standards.
Traditional enforcement techniques, aimed almost exclusively at governments, currently
provide limited deterrence against human rights violations. It is true, of course, that the
dearth of realistic practical incentives and consequences for governments is central to this
lack of effective deterrence and most ultimately be addressed.144 However, it seems
equally rational to believe that an increased focus on individual accountability should
improve deterrence by creating significant personal disincentives for individual
perpetrators of abuse. Although currently only a potential, an optimist could easily
envision a network of states utilizing universal jurisdiction to provide criminal and civil
remedies in a fashion that denies “safe haven” to individual human rights violators.145
An important first step in preventing violations is eliminating the perception of individual
impunity generated by current conditions.
This focus on individual accountability also tends to circumvent the paucity of
government incentives to effectively enforce international standards against other
governments. Both the Filartiga and Pinochet style remedies are dependant to some

144

See supra notes 80, 84-86, 141-43 and accompanying text.
This is a common theme of those who advocate use of transnational litigation. See, e.g., Colliver, Green
& Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable By Using International Law in the U.S. Courts,
19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 177-79 (2005).
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degree on the political will of the host forum which must, in the first instance, generally
authorize such remedies.146 However, if appropriately limited to avoid overt political
abuse and conflicts with national foreign policy, neither remedy should depend directly
on case by case government bound motivations, which are inevitably linked to competing
policy and political interests. Once such actions are authorized by domestic law,
particular cases are at least partly isolated from competing national interests. This, and
increased victim access and control over remedies, should lessen the potential for
political manipulations—a problem that has often plagued the work of international
human rights bodies.
Finally, although in distinct ways, each of these developing enforcement
alternatives avoids some of the institutional weaknesses reflected in the traditional
mechanisms for enforcement.147 Domestic institutions utilized under the Filartiga and
Pinochet paradigms will usually enjoy well-established authority and effective means for
effectuating their decisions. Domestic courts, for example, are more likely to be staffed
by independent professional judges and their jurisdiction defined and controlled by
legislation. Also subject to a degree of public accountability, such institutions enjoy
attributes of legitimacy and credibility currently lacking in most existing international
forums.148

146

The host forum legal system must authorize or approve such remedies, typically through legislative or
judicial action. Similarly, criminal prosecutions such as in Pinochet will typically depend on discretionary
judgments made by government prosecutors or judges. See, e.g., supra notes 93-97, 100 and accompanying
text.
147
International institutions currently have many built-in limitations on their enforcement capacity, some of
which are inherent. See supra notes 42-54, 60-63, 74-77 and accompanying text. Reliance on wellestablished and respected domestic institutions with regularized enforcement capacity helps avoid some of
these limitations.
148
There is, however, at least one sense in which foreign domestic institutions will lack an important
component of legitimacy. Decisions rendered by foreign domestic processes regarding extraterritorial
events possess neither intrinsic connections nor elements of local accountability to the people and culture of
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It is easy, however, to overstate the potential enforcement value of these
alternatives. The options described above are, at least for now, not sufficiently
widespread or accepted to make significant advances towards alleviating human rights
abuses.149 Put into perspective, it is difficult to view the limited number of civil
judgments against foreign defendants brought before U.S. courts as anything other than
symbolic.150 Similarly, the reality is that there have been no successful domestic criminal
prosecutions following the Pinochet model and Belgium’s recent experiment with full
scale adoption of universal jurisdiction, has revealed problematic implications and
distinct practical limitations on its use.151
There also appears to be significant limits on the potential effectiveness of
international criminal processes. The number of actual defendants that will appear before

the place where the relevant violations occurred. See supra notes 97, 99 and accompanying text. This lack
of “connectivity” makes it critical that such foreign or extrinsic remedies focus on the narrow range of
rights that enjoy universal acceptance and clear definitions susceptible to culturally neutral applications.
See Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance and the Margin of Appreciation, supra note 22 at 450-66.
149
Evidence about the potential spread of Filartiga style civil remedies to countries outside of the United
States is somewhat murky. There is at least some evidence that similar remedies are increasingly available
in Europe in the form of reparations relating to criminal charges for extraterritorial human rights violations.
See Van Schaak, supra note 90 at 144-47.
150
While many claims have been brought under the ATCA and TVPA, see Stephens, Individuals Enforcing
International Law, supra note 18, only a modest number have resulted in judgments, mostly through
default. See Colliver, supra note 145 at 176 (citing 16 litigations resulting in judgments); Beth Stephens,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533,
534 (2004-2005)( “interest [in ATCA] far outstrips the actual results of the litigation: most ATS cases have
been dismissed, only about two dozen cases have produced final judgments under the statute, and only one
judgment has led to the collection of significant damages.”). See also Van Schaak, supra note 90 at 170;
The requirements of jurisdiction essentially ensure that only a limited number of defendants -- those who
travel to the United States-- will ever be brought to justice before U.S. courts. But see Colliver, supra note
145 at 175 (Center for Justice and Accountability estimates that “several hundred” potential defendants
currently reside in the United States). Similarly, the potential for victims to ever in fact receive
compensation is probably limited in that most defendants do not have significant assets. See, e.g., George
Stavis, Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases—Flexibility for Non-Profit Litigators?, 31
COLUM. H. RTS L. REV. 209, 214-16 (1999); Colliver, supra note 145 at 179. Whether such suits provide
any realistic deterrence against human rights violations remains correspondingly uncertain. However, as
many have pointed out, symbolism and intangible benefits to those limited number of victims who find
their way to U.S. courts have real value if for no other reason than preventing the United States from
becoming a safe haven for human rights abusers. Id. at 175-86.
151
See Steven Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 A.J. INT’L L. 888, 891-94 (2003);
Damien Vandermeersch, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 400, 404-09.
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such tribunals, if the ICTY’s experiences hold true, will be quite limited. Like the ad hoc
tribunals before it, the ICC will undoubtedly have difficulty apprehending future
defendants and the subsidiary role of the ICC will limit its prosecutions to those where
political conditions become favorable and domestic alternatives are impossible.152
Yet, despite these limits and other potential downsides, these developing
alternatives should be lauded as potentially useful tools for enforcing human rights. Each
has, in essence, opened new frontiers in the quest for accountability. Their importance
does not lie in their current effectiveness but rather in their potential. The Filartiga and
Pinochet approaches create potentially vibrant enforcement precedents by opening
neutral domestic courts to victims of human rights violations occurring in places where
local domestic redress is implausible or ineffective. Widespread adoption of such
remedies grounded in appropriately limited universal jurisdiction, especially among
Western industrialized democracies where former human rights abusers are most likely to
hide, would undoubtedly increase the potential that human rights victims will have access
to neutral and effective judicial redress.

B. Insights for Reform: Defining Appropriate Roles for International Institutions
What lessons for improving existing institutional frameworks may be drawn from
the enforcement alternatives described above and the successes of the ECHR? Initially, it
should be recognized that effective international human rights institutions are critical to
world-wide realization of human rights. Enforcement of human rights is ideally the job
of domestic institutions where alleged violations occur. We live, however, in a less than
ideal world where effective domestic protection of individual rights will continue to be
152

See generally Goldsmith, supra note 131.
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often impossible. In our imperfect world, international human rights bodies must and
should play a vital role in enforcing rights and providing redress.153
The central characteristics of the enforcement alternatives described above
provide insights into how a remodeled international system might more effectively fulfill
these functions. First and most importantly, the international community should make
critical distinctions among rights with regard to enforceability. Enforcement mechanisms
regarding well defined, universally accepted rights for which international consensus
over meaning exists will be more palatable and more readily accepted by governments.
This is true not only for accused governments, but also for the international community
generally, whose cooperation in creating meaningful incentives for compliance is vital.
Mandatory sanctions through recourse to Security Council, or economic incentives linked
to the WTO or IMF are, for example, far more likely to be accepted if limited to
violations of universally understood and accepted rights.
Similarly, this more nuanced approach to the enforceability of different categories
of rights, if coupled with other institutional reforms, would significantly enhance the
perceived legitimacy of international human rights institutions. Attempts to
authoritatively interpret and enforce specific applications of human rights that are subject
to genuine cultural and political dispute inevitably raise concerns about over-reaching,
lack of accountability and usurpation of local choice. By focusing enforcement efforts
(as opposed to non-binding promotional activity) on universally understood and relatively
uncontroversial rights, concerns over institutional legitimacy are greatly ameliorated.
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These international institutions also serve many valuable roles apart from enforcement. The work of
promoting rights awareness, exposing violations and responding to human rights crises is vital, and in
critical ways, distinct from the work of authoritative enforcement.
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Such distinctions among rights also lend themselves to important institutional
reforms that could prompt governments to accept more authoritative enforcement
mandates. For example, the newly created ICC has enormous potential for engendering
state respect for its authority that is typically missing with existing international human
rights institutions. Unlike most existing institutions, the ICC has been created with a
clearly defined and circumscribed mandate and relatively narrow subject matter focus.
Fears of over reaching or politicized decision making should be generally alleviated by
the subsidiary nature of the Court’s jurisdiction. While the ICC’s ultimate legitimacy and
credibility will depend in part on whether it earns the respect of states incrementally over
time, it is legally well situated to accomplish that goal. The jurisdiction and mandate of
existing institutions should be amended and clarified, or new institutions created, to
reflect such distinctions.
Such distinctions and limits on jurisdictional mandate will not only greatly
improve the perceived legitimacy of human rights institutions; they may help mediate the
inherent tension between authoritative international enforcement and domestic
democratic prerogatives. I have argued elsewhere that the preservation of democratic
values and our concerns over the democratic legitimacy of human rights decision making
should shape how the international community approaches enforcement, particularly
regarding the authority of international institutions.154 Indeed, in a perfect world
populated by functioning democratic states with reasonable domestic institutional
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Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 10.
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safeguards, authoritative international remedies might reasonably be seen as
inappropriate or counterproductive to democratic ideals.155
A key consideration in this regard once again involves jurisdictional constraint
and distinctions among rights. Enforcement focused on international consensus,
universal jurisdiction and jus cogens, for example, sharply reduces concerns over the
democratic authenticity and accountability of international decision making. Violations
subject to universal jurisdiction, like those that justify the prosecution of war crimes by
the ICC, are not “foreign” or “external” to the world’s domestic legal systems and
societies. Rather, parallel legal norms exist within virtually all domestic legal systems
and are deeply interwoven into the cultural and social fabric of every society. A new
name for an old wrong like “ethnic cleansing” doesn’t imply that the Bosnian Serbs had a
different moral or legal code on that subject before international standards were
developed by the ICTY. The traditional norms and morals of virtually all societies,
including Serbian, were violated by the atrocities committed in Bosnia.
The creation of new or revised enforcement mandates, limited to rights over
which true international consensus exists, should be coupled with other institutional
reforms designed to promote credibility and respect. Models for such institutions reforms
should include the ECHR and ICC. Although imperfect, both institutions possess
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Id. at 56-64. It must be acknowledged that the developing enforcement alternatives described above, if
used without constraint, are not entirely consistent with this outlook. For example, the most troubling
objections to the Pinochet case have centered on the policy implications that arise when foreign courts
indict former heads of states or other public officials, particularly when the originating jurisdiction has
granted amnesties or is attempting other forms of national reconciliation. Foreign litigation and
prosecutions under these circumstances have the potential to usurp the originating state’s domestic
processes and prerogatives. This potential for external interference with domestic democratic choice is
similar to that created by authoritative international decision making. In this sense, the Pinochet and
Filartiga paradigms create variants on the inherent tension between international and domestic authority.
Thus, these enforcement paradigms create new and distinct accountability issues since each involves
decision makers external to the people, cultural and context in which the violations took place.
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generally credible and neutral procedures for selecting judges or “experts,” professional
and regularized rules of evidence and procedures, and plausibly sufficient staffs and
budgets.
Finally, the reforms described above must be accompanied by efforts to link
resulting international decisions to practical economic and political consequences that
create practical incentives for voluntary compliance. Such incentives, crucial to the
success of the ECHR, are only likely to develop, however, with regard to decisions
limited to enforcement of a fairly narrow range of universal rights over which true
concerns exists.

Conclusion
Enforcement remains the weakest component of the international human rights
system. Designed around the implausible premise of voluntary state compliance, existing
international institutions outside of Europe currently lack the capacity to meaningfully
enforce human rights in a world characterized by conflict and diversity. Already hobbled
by institutional weaknesses, existing human rights bodies have failed to develop
incrementally their legitimacy and earn the respect of governments by developing a
nuanced approach to enforcement that recognizes distinctions among rights regarding
enforceability. Lessons for reform should be drawn in this regard from the ECHR and
developing enforcement alternatives which focus on individual accountability for a fairly
narrow range of rights over which international consensus exists.
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